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Criminal Forfeiture Procedure: 2006
Stefan D. Cassella1
A survey of the developments in the case law in the past year
relating to the procedure for obtaining a forfeiture judgment as part of
the sentence in a federal criminal case.
Introduction
This article is intended to bring the reader up to date on developments in
the federal case law relating to criminal forfeiture procedure.  It does not cover
every topic related to criminal forfeiture, nor all of the exceptions and nuances
that apply to the topics that are discussed; rather, it covers only those matters on
which there was a significant development in the case law in the past year.  Thus
a basic familiarity with federal criminal forfeiture procedure is assumed.2
The article begins with the law on the scope of criminal forfeiture and the
seizure and restraint of property prior to trial.  It then continues more or less
chronologically through the trial, sentencing, ancillary proceeding and post-trial
phases of a criminal forfeiture case.  Except in instances where it is necessary to
refer to the leading case in a given area for purposes of comparison or context,
the citations are limited to the cases decided in 2005 and early 2006.
I.  The Scope of Criminal Forfeiture
Every lecture on criminal forfeiture begins with the elementary point that
because forfeiture is part of the sentence in a criminal case, the forfeiture is
limited to the property involved in the offense for which the defendant was
convicted.  If the defendant is convicted of Crime X, the Government may forfeit
the property involved in X, not the property involved in Crime Y.  If the prosecutor
wants to forfeit what is involved in Crime Y, he must convict the defendant of
3 United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Va. 2005).
4 United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 n.19 (E.D. Va. 2005) (because
defendant can only be liable to forfeit the property involved in the offenses for which he was
convicted, he can only be liable for the amounts involved in the fraud offenses for which he was
charged and not for the amounts involved in the money laundering offenses committed by his
codefendants).
5 United States v. Juluke, 426 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2005).
6 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (authorizing criminal forfeiture of any property derived from or 
used to commit a drug trafficking offense).
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Crime Y or file a separate civil forfeiture action.  This point seems obvious but
turns out to be far more subtle than was once thought.  
Criminal forfeiture is limited to property involved in the offense of conviction
We start with the obvious: forfeiture may be ordered only with respect to
the offense for which the defendant was convicted.  As a district court held in
United States v. Wingerter,3 if the defendant is convicted only of fraud, and is not
convicted of money laundering, the Government can forfeit the property involved
in the fraud, but not the property involved only in the money laundering offense
that was committed by his co-defendants.4
Moreover, the property forfeited must be connected in some way to the
specific offense for which the defendant was convicted; in a criminal case, it is not
enough to show that the property was derived from a general course of conduct
of which the offense of conviction was a part.  
In United States v. Juluke,5 law enforcement agents pursued the defendant
as he pulled from the driveway of his residence in his car.  Realizing that he was
being followed, and hoping to distance himself from any incriminating evidence,
the defendant tossed a bag of heroin from the car window, but watched to his
dismay as the bag exploded on the windshield of the agents’ vehicle, dusting it
with white powder.  A subsequent search of the residence yielded evidence of on-
going drug trafficking activity, including a quantity of currency, firearms and
jewelry.  
The defendant was charged with a drug offense and convicted.  As part of
his sentence, he was ordered to forfeit his residence as property used to facilitate
the commission of his offense, as well as the firearms, currency and jewelry.6  On
7 United States v. Juluke, 426 F.3d 323, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2005) (the Government must
prove that the property subject to forfeiture was the proceeds of the drug activity that formed
the basis for the defendant’s conviction, not of the defendant’s drug trafficking generally).
8 United States v. Nava,  404 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005)
9 United States v. Nava,  404 F.3d 1119, 1129 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (even though
defendant was engaged in drug dealing as long ago as 1991, Government’s interest in his
property did not vest until 1997 because the only offense for which he was convicted began in
that year; there can be no forfeiture based on earlier conduct that was not charged).
10 United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1279 n.19 (11th Cir. 2003) (the court in a
money laundering case may not impose a forfeiture order based on a money laundering
offense with which defendant was not charged or for which he was acquitted, but if he is
convicted of a conspiracy, the forfeiture may be based on amounts defendant conspired to
launder, including amounts derived from uncharged substantive conduct, or substantive counts
for which he has been acquitted).
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appeal, the Fifth Circuit had little problem with most of the forfeiture; the house,
firearms, and currency were all forfeitable as property involved in the offense for
which the defendant was convicted; but the panel held that the Government had
not established the requisite nexus between that offense and the jewelry.   That
property, the court said, appeared to have been purchased with the proceeds of
earlier drug crimes, not the proceeds of the specific offense involved in the instant
case.7
The Ninth Circuit said the same thing in United States v. Nava.8  If the
defendant is convicted of drug dealing that started in 1997, he may be ordered to
forfeit property derived from that offense, but not property derived from drug
dealing that occurred back in 1991.9
There are several ways in which the Government can work around this
limitation on the scope of criminal forfeiture.  The most common is simply to file a
civil forfeiture complaint against the property involved in the uncharged conduct.
In the criminal case itself, however, the Government may forfeit all of the property
involved in a series of offenses by charging the defendant with a conspiracy or
other overarching offense.
For example, several years ago the Eleventh Circuit held that if a
defendant is convicted of a money laundering conspiracy, he must forfeit all of the
money he conspired to launder, including amounts involved in uncharged conduct
or conduct alleged in substantive counts on which he was found not guilty.10
11 United States v. Hively, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 305515 (8th Cir. Feb. 10, 2006).
12 Id., at *8 (RICO defendant is liable for the proceeds of the entire scheme, not just the
proceeds of the two predicate acts on which he was convicted).
13 United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 03-789 (FLW) (D.N.J. June 6, 2005).
14 United States v. Rodriguez, Cr. No. 03-789 (FLW), slip op. at 4-5 (D.N.J. June 6,
2005) (forfeiture in a structuring case is not limited to the amounts involved in the substantive
offenses on which the defendant was convicted;  if the jury finds that the offenses were part of
a course of conduct involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period, the Government is
entitled to the forfeiture of property involved in that course of conduct).
15 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § § 1341 and 1343.
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Similarly, this year, in United States v. Hively,11 the Eighth Circuit held that a
defendant convicted of a RICO offense must forfeit all of the proceeds of the
offense, including property derived from substantive predicate acts on which he
was personally acquitted.12
A district court reached a similar result in United States v. Rodriguez.13 In
that case, the defendant was convicted of six substantive counts of structuring
currency transactions in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324.  Because the jury found
the offense to be part of a pattern involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month
period, the defendant was subject to the enhanced penalty provision in Section
5322(b).
In the same vein, the Government argued that because the crime was part
of a continuing offense, the forfeiture should not be limited to the amounts
involved in the six substantive offenses on which the defendant was found guilty,
but should include all of the funds involved in the entire scheme.  The district
court agreed with the Government and ordered the forfeiture of $1.2 million.14
The scope of forfeiture in fraud cases
The interesting question is how this principle applies in fraud cases in
which the Government is required to prove that the defendant engaged in a
“scheme or plan.”15  If the Government proves the existence of the scheme but
the defendant is convicted of only 10 representative counts of fraud involving,
say, 10 mailings or 10 victims, must the forfeiture be limited to the amount
involved in those 10 counts, or must the defendant forfeit the amount involved in
the entire scheme?  The law has been unclear on that for some time, but the
Seventh Circuit has now upheld the pre-trial restraint of the amount involved in an
16 United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2005)
17 United States v. Phillips, 434 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2005) (pretrial restraint of
defendant’s assets is not limited by the amount involved in the specific substantive health
care fraud counts alleged in the indictment as long as the amount of proceeds derived from
the entire scheme is alleged as well).
18 United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining the
difference between civil and criminal forfeiture; because criminal forfeiture is in personam,
only the defendant’s property can be forfeited; because defendant’s daughter was the true
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entire fraud scheme even though the defendant was charged with substantive
counts involving only a fraction of the money.
In United States v. Phillips,16 the original indictment charged the defendant
– a health care professional involved in providing psychotherapy to nursing home
patients –  with five substantive health care fraud violations involving a total of
$47,947.87 in proceeds.  When the Government sought the pre-trial restraint of a
larger amount, the defendant objected, arguing that because only the smaller
amount could be forfeited, only that amount could be restrained.  In response, the
Government obtained a superseding indictment which alleged the same five
substantive counts but also alleged that the defendant had obtained a total of
$1,165,000 in fraud proceeds in the course of the scheme.
Relying on the allegations in the superseding indictment, the district court
entered an order restraining the larger amount that the Government wanted
preserved for forfeiture in the event of conviction.  The defendant continued to
object, but on appeal, the panel held that as long as the indictment alleged that
the larger amount was obtained in the course of the scheme, it could be
restrained pre-trial.17
Property of third parties cannot be forfeited in a criminal case
In Nava, the Ninth Circuit also reiterated the general proposition that
property belonging to third parties cannot be forfeited in a criminal case.  In that
case, the Government was seeking the forfeiture of property used to facilitate the
distribution of methamphetamine.  Because the defendant’s daughter was the
real owner of the property, the court said, the property could not be forfeited as
part of the defendant’s sentence.  In such cases, if the Government wants to
forfeit the property, it must commence a parallel civil forfeiture case in which the
daughter would have to establish an “innocent owner” defense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(d).18
owner and not merely a nominee, she was entitled to prevail in the ancillary proceeding).
19 United States v. Holden, 2005 WL 1593911 (N.D. Ohio Jul. 7, 2005).
20 Id., at 2.
21 Id., at 4.
22 United States v. Tedder, 2003 WL 23204849, at *2-3 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 28, 2003), aff’d,
403 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2005).
23 See United States v. Tedder, 2003 WL 23204849 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 28, 2003) (the
laundered money may be forfeited in a money laundering case in which the money launderer
is convicted without having to show that the defendant was the owner of the money); aff’d,
403 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2005).
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A district court in Ohio made the same point in United States v. Holden.19
Criminal forfeiture, the court said, puts the Government in the shoes of the
defendant, “acquiring only the rights of the defendant at the time of the criminal
acts, and nothing more.”20  In that case, however, the court held that the family
members who challenged the forfeiture of the property in the criminal case had
no ownership rights in the property and thus could not prevail.21
Property involved in money laundering 
If property belonging to third parties cannot be forfeited in a criminal case,
can anything be forfeited in a money laundering case in which the defendant is
convicted of laundering money on behalf of someone else?  As the district court
held in United States v. Tedder,22 the answer is yes: property involved in money
laundering, like criminal proceeds, can always be forfeited in a criminal case
based on its nexus to the offense. 
Criminal forfeiture does not require proof that the defendant has acquired
an interest in the property; the rule is only that property belonging to a third party
cannot be forfeited.  A defendant may never acquire a legal interest in the
proceeds of crime, yet he may be required to forfeit those proceeds if he is
convicted.  Similarly, a defendant may never acquire a legal interest in the
property he is laundering for a third party, but the forfeiture of the property may be
ordered in the criminal case.23
As discussed later, forfeiture in a criminal case is based on the nexus of
the property to the offense, not on the ownership of the property.  The ownership
24 Moreover, as discussed later, if it cannot recover the laundered property itself, the
Government is entitled to a money judgment against the defendant for the amount laundered.  
25 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) provides that the procedures in 21 U.S.C. § 853 serve as the
procedures for all criminal forfeiture cases, whether they are incorporated into the forfeiture
statute by reference or not.  Some statutes nevertheless incorporate the procedures by
reference.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 982(b).
26 See, e.g., § § 853(c) and (e).
27 United States v. Ivanchukov, 405 F. Supp.2d 708 (E.D. Va. 2005).
28 Id. at 711-12 (for forfeitures governed by § 982, § 982(b) incorporates all of the
procedures from 21 U.S.C. § 853 – including those relating to pre-trial restraint and substitute
assets – and the references to “subsection (a)” in § 853 are meant as references to § 982(a)).
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issue comes into play only in the ancillary proceeding if a third party objects to the
forfeiture on the ground that the property really belongs to him.  Thus, in a money
laundering case, the third party owner of the property may make a claim to it in
the ancillary proceeding if he wants to, but barring such a successful claim, the
property is subject to forfeiture.24
II.  Criminal Forfeiture Procedure
Most criminal forfeiture statutes describe the property subject to forfeiture
in connection with a given offense but do not contain any procedural provisions. 
Rather, most statutes incorporate the procedures from 21 U.S.C. § 853.25
Section 853 contains several references, however, to property subject to
forfeiture “under subsection (a).”26 In a drug case where § 853 applies directly,
the references to “subsection (a)” are to § 853(a), which describes the property
subject to forfeiture in a drug case.  The question addressed by the district court
in United States v. Ivanchukov27 was what do those references mean when the
provisions of § 853 are incorporated into another forfeiture statute.  
The district court explained that in those instances, the references to
“subsection (a)” in § 853 should be read as referring the to the substantive portion
of the statute into which the procedures are incorporated.28  So, when the
procedures in § 853 are incorporated into § 982, for example, the references to
“subsection (a)” are to the applicable provisions in § 982(a), which describes the
29 See § 982(a)(1).
30 See § 982(a)(6).
31 Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents, 401 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2005).
32 Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents, 401 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2005) (it is not
necessary for the Government to have seized the property prior to obtaining a criminal
forfeiture order; therefore, an illegal seizure has no effect on a criminal forfeiture).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1193 (2d Cir. 1991); (“notice
and a hearing need not occur before an ex parte restraining order is entered pursuant to
section 853(e)(1)(A)”).  But some courts consider this an open question.  See United States v.
Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 1998) (whether pre-restraint hearing is required is
an open question); United States v. Melrose East Subdivision, 357 F.3d 493, 499 n.3 (5th Cir.
2004) (same, but noting authority for the proposition that due process does not require a pre-
restraint hearing in the context of post-indictment restraining orders).
34 United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2005).
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property subject to forfeiture in connection with money laundering,29 alien
smuggling,30 and numerous other federal crimes.
III.  Pre-Trial Seizure of Assets
In Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents,31 the Fifth Circuit had to determine
what effect the illegal pre-trial seizure of the defendant’s property might have on
the ability of the court to order the criminal forfeiture of that property as part of the
defendant’s sentence.  The court’s answer was that it would have no effect at all. 
The defendant’s remedy for the illegal seizure is to move to suppress the use of
the seized property as evidence at trial.  But because pre-trial seizure is not
required for criminal forfeiture, an illegal seizure will not bar the forfeiture of the
property once the defendant is convicted.32
IV.  Pretrial Restraint of Assets
The criteria for issuing a post-indictment restraining order
All courts that have addressed the issue hold that the defendant has no
right to a pre-restraint hearing when the Government seeks a pre-trial restraining
order to preserve his property for forfeiture pending trial; thus the Government
may apply for, and the court may issue, the restraining order ex parte.33  In United
States v. Jamieson,34 the Sixth Circuit followed the general rule, holding that the
35 United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d at 405-06 (restraining order may be entered
upon the filing of the indictment; post-restraint hearing under the Jones-Farmer rule is sufficient
to protect defendant’s right to due process).  The Jones-Farmer rule is discussed in the text,
infra.
36 United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 806 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2005) (the
listing of the property in the forfeiture allegation in the indictment reflects the grand jury’s
finding of probable cause regarding the forfeitability of the property; the restraining order may
be issued based on the showing of probable cause alone; there is no need to show, as there
is for preindictment orders, that the property is likely to disappear).
37 United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 811 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“there is no
discretion to permit a defendant to spend assets that are subject to forfeiture, including
substitute assets. They must be preserved for forfeiture.”), citing United States v. Monsanto,
491 U.S. 600, 612-13 (1989) (the word “may” in section 853(e) means only that the district
court may enter a restraining order if the Government requests it, but not otherwise, and that it
is not required to enter the order if a bond or other means exists to preserve the property; it
“cannot sensibly be construed to give district court[s] discretion to permit the dissipation of the
very property that section 853(a) requires to be forfeited upon conviction”).
38 Id.
39 See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 982(b).
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restraining order was properly issued based on the grand jury’s finding of
probable cause in the indictment, and that the defendant’s due process rights
were adequately protected by his right to a post-restraint hearing under the
Jones-Farmer rule.35
In Wingerter, the district court made the same point regarding the issuance
of the restraining order based on the grand jury’s finding of probable cause.36
Moreover, the court reiterated what the Supreme Court held in Monsanto:
issuance of a pretrial restraining order is not discretionary; if the Government
makes the requisite showing, the court must enter the order.37  That rule, the
court emphasized, applies equally in the Fourth Circuit whether the property
subject to pre-trial restraint is directly traceable to the underlying offense or is
forfeitable only as a substitute asset.38
Restraining orders under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c): the Razmilovic issue
As already mentioned, most criminal forfeiture statutes borrow their
forfeiture procedures from § 853.  In the older provisions, this was done by direct
incorporation of the § 853 procedures into whatever statute needed them.39  In
2000, however, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) to make the procedures
40 See United States v. Causey, 309 F. Supp. 2d 917, 922 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
(section 2461(c) incorporates the restraining order provision in section 853(e); if Congress
meant to exclude that subsection, it would not have expressly excluded only subsection (d));
United States v. Wittig, 2004 WL 1490406, at *2 (D. Kan. Jun. 30, 2004) (section 2461(c)
incorporates pretrial restraining order provision in section 853(e)).
41 United States v. Razmilovic, 419 F.3d 134, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2005) (section 2461(c)
incorporates only the post-conviction procedures in section 853; because section 853(e) is not
a post-conviction procedure, it is not incorporated, and there was no need for Congress to
expressly exclude it).
42 Id. at 137.
43 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-___,
§ 410 (2006).   
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in § 853 the default for any criminal forfeiture statute that did not have procedures
of its own.  Because of an ambiguity in the drafting of § 2461(c), however, the
courts were divided over whether that statute incorporated the pre-trial restraining
order provision in section 853(e).
In 2004, two district courts, one of them in the Enron case, held that
§ 2461(c) incorporates all of the provisions of § 853, including the restraining
order provision in § 853(e).40  But in 2005 the Second Circuit went the other way,
holding in United States v. Razmilovic that there is no authority to issue a pre-trial
restraining order in a fraud case or any other case where the forfeiture depends
on § 2461(c).41  In the court’s view, the phase “upon conviction” in § 2461(c)
referred not only to the time when the order of forfeiture must be entered but also
limited the incorporation of the procedures from § 853 to those that applied in the
post-conviction context.42
In 2006, Congress acted quickly to rectify this problem, rewriting § 2461(c)
to make clear that the procedures in § 853 apply to all stages of a criminal
forfeiture case.43
Post-restraint hearings: the Jones-Farmer rule
The emerging rule is that a post-restraint, pretrial hearing is required only if
the Sixth Amendment is implicated (because the defendant has no other funds
with which to hire counsel), and only if the defendant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no probable cause for the forfeiture of the restrained
44 See United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 647 (10th Cir. 1998) (defendant has initial
burden of showing that he has no funds other than the restrained assets to hire private
counsel or to pay for living expenses, and that there is bona fide reason to believe the
restraining order should not have been entered); United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 804-
05 (4th Cir. 2001) (defendant entitled to pretrial hearing if property is seized for civil forfeiture
if he demonstrates that he has no other assets available; following Jones).
45 United States v. Jamieson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 754, 757 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (following
Jones; to satisfy Sixth Amendment requirement, defendant must show he has no access to
funds from friends or family; Government has right to rebut showing of lack of funds if hearing
is granted).
46 United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 406-07 (6th Cir. 2005) (approving district
court’s decision to apply Jones, and noting that court gave defendant second chance to
satisfy Jones and then had Government put on a witness to establish probable cause).
47 United States v. Varner, 2005 WL 2206083 (W.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2005).
48 Id., at *1.
49 United States v. 250 Lindsay Lane, 2005 WL 1994762 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005).
50 Id., at *7.
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property.  This is the Jones-Farmer rule.44 In 2005, there were a number of new
cases applying this rule.
In Jamieson, the district court applied the rule, holding that the defendant
had no right to a post-restraint hearing unless he showed that he had no access
to funds from friends or family that he could use to hire counsel.45  Then, when
the defendant made that showing, the court conducted a probable cause hearing
but refused to release the restrained funds when the Government satisfied the
probable cause requirement.  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit said it had “no quarrel”
with what the district court had done.46
In United States v. Varner,47 the district court followed Farmer; denying the
defendant’s request for a probable cause hearing for failure to show that he was
“completely unable to afford counsel without resorting to the restrained assets.”48
Similarly, in United States v. 250 Lindsay Lane,49 the district court, following
Jones, Farmer and Jamieson, conducted a Jones hearing, determined that the
defendant had satisfied both requirements, and then a probable cause hearing at
which it determined that a fraction of the restrained assets had to be released.50
51 See United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 (E.D. Va. 2005) (in
districts that permit the pretrial restraint of substitute assets, the defendant may challenge the
restraint at a Monsanto hearing only if he first satisfies both criteria under the Jones-Farmer
rule); United States v. Benyo, 384 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911 (E.D. Va. 2005) (scheduling a
Monsanto hearing on the continuation of pretrial restraint of substitute assets after defendants
satisfy both Jones requirements).
52 United States v. Phillips, 434 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding it unnecessary to
decide under what circumstances due process requires a post-restraint probable cause
hearing because whatever the standard may be, defendant must do more than make a
conclusory statement that she needs the money for her defense). See also United States v.
Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 406 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases following Jones-Farmer and
other procedures).
53 See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989).
54 United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2005) (Government
established probable cause at Monsanto hearing, so property remained restrained and court
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It is worth noting that the district courts in the Fourth Circuit hold that
Jones-Farmer applies to substitute assets that have been restrained pretrial.51
Jones-Farmer is still not universally accepted as the procedure governing
post-restraint hearings, however.  In Phillips, for example, the Seventh Circuit
reserved judgment on whether to adopt it, but held that whatever the standard
might be for triggering the defendant’s right to a post-restraint hearing, she
certainly had to do more than make a conclusory statement that she needed the
money for her defense.52
The important thing to remember is that satisfying the Jones requirements
just gets the defendant a probable cause hearing; if the Government establishes
probable cause, the property remains restrained, even if the defendant needs the
money to retain counsel.53  Thus there is a two-step process: first the court
determines if the defendant satisfies the Jones-Farmer requirements; then, if so,
the court conducts a Monsanto hearing to determine if the Government has
probable cause as to some, all, or part of the restrained property. 
In Jamieson, the court found that the Government satisfied the probable
cause requirement and therefore held that the property would remain under
restraint.  To preserve the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, it appointed
counsel under the CJA and authorized $100,000 for investigative expenses and
expert witnesses.  The defendant complained that that wasn’t enough, but the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.54
appointed Criminal Justice Act  counsel to represent defendant at trial and authorized
$100,000 for investigative expenses and expert witnesses).
55 United States v. Prejean, 2005 WL 3543817 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2005).
56 Id., at *2 (applying Jones and Melrose East: defendants’ showing that they have no
other funds with which to hire counsel or pay living expenses means that they have a due
process right to a probable cause hearing, but it does not determine the amount of money to
be released; whether defendants are entitled to the release of some, all, or none of the
restrained property depends on the Government’s ability to show probable cause to believe
the property is forfeitable, not on the extent of the defendants’ financial need).
57 United States v. 250 Lindsay Lane, 2005 WL 1994762, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 16,
2005) (following Melrose East; because Government established probable cause as to 82
percent of the restrained property, only 18 percent could be released for attorney’s fees and
living expenses).
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In United States v. Prejean,55 a defendant who was charged with
distributing unnecessary prescription pain medications complained that the
district court had restrained the funds that he needed to retain counsel.  The court
applied Jones-Farmer, determined that the defendant had a right to a hearing,
and then, after the hearing, agreed to release $300,000.  The defendant said that
that wasn’t enough, that he needed more money for counsel and living expenses;
but the court explained that defendant did not understand the process.
His showing that he needed the restrained money for counsel and living
expenses meant that the defendant satisfied the Jones requirements and was
entitled to a probable cause hearing, but if the Government established probable
cause as to all but $300,000, then $300,000 was all that defendant was entitled to
have released.  That he needed more money than that was irrelevant; if the
Government had established probable cause as to the entire amount restrained
he would have been entitled to the release of nothing at all.56
The district court’s decision in 250 Lindsay Lane is to the same effect:
because the Government established probable cause as to 82 percent of the
restrained property, the court held, only 18 percent could be released for
attorneys fees.  The amount the defendant claimed he needed for attorneys fees
was irrelevant at that point.57
Procedure at the probable cause hearing
58 See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1989) (standard for issuance
of restraining order is probable cause); United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D.
Va. 2005) (issue at the Monsanto hearing is whether there is probable cause to believe the
property is subject to forfeiture; if Government’s theory is that defendants are jointly and
severally liable, there must be probable cause to believe amount to be forfeited was
foreseeable to defendant); United States v. Jamieson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 754, 756 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (Rule 65 does not apply to post-indictment restraining orders), aff’d, 427 F.3d 394 (6th
Cir.  2005).
59 See United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 406 (6th Cir. 2005) (initial issuance of
restraining order may be based on grand jury’s finding of probable cause; probable cause may
be challenged in post-restraint hearing if defendant satisfies Jones requirements); United
States v. 250 Lindsay Lane, 2005 WL 1994762, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005) (after defendant
satisfies Jones requirements, he may challenge the probable cause for the forfeiture, but not
the probable cause for the underlying criminal offense).
60 United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 2005) (testimony of witness
who said defendant’s only source of income during the time he acquired the restrained assets
was his fraud scheme was sufficient to establish probable cause).
61 United States v. 250 Lindsay Lane, 2005 WL 1994762, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005)
(if 82 percent of defendant’s income was from fraud, then there is probable cause to believe
that 82 percent of the property acquired during that period is subject to forfeiture as property
traceable to the fraud).
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If the defendant is entitled to a hearing, the Government’s burden is to
establish probable cause.58  Generally, while the court may rely on the grand
jury’s finding of probable cause to issue the restraining order, if the defendant is
entitled to a probable cause hearing, he can challenge the grand jury’s finding ab
initio at the hearing.59
Evidence needed to establish probable cause for restraint at the Monsanto
hearing:
What evidence must the Government put on to establish probable cause
that the restrained property is criminal proceeds?  In Jamieson, it satisfied the
requirement with a witness who testified that the defendant’s only source of
income was his fraud scheme.60  In Lindsay Lane, it showed that 82 percent of
defendant’s income was from fraud, which allowed the court to conclude that 82
percent of the property he acquired during that time was from fraud proceeds.61
If the court has ordered the restraint of substitute assets, the question at
the probable cause hearing is whether there is probable cause to believe the
62 See United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809-10 (E.D. Va. 2005)
(Monsanto applies to the pretrial restraint of substitute assets in districts that permit such
restraint; notwithstanding defendant’s need to use restrained funds to hire counsel, substitute
assets remain restrained if there is probable cause to believe defendant committed the
offense and that the value of the property subject to forfeiture does not exceed the value of
the restrained funds).
63 See United States v. Lebed, 2005 WL 2495843, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2005) (lis
pendens is not a restraint; therefore, the Government may file lis pendens on substitute
assets).
64 United States v. Bailey, 419 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005).
65 Id. at 1218 (noting that the Government is not without remedy when the forfeitable
property is in the hands of a third party: it can request a pretrial restraining order).
66 See United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 795 (7th Cir. 1998) (court has no
jurisdiction over defendant’s wife and so cannot restrain her property, but court may restrain
property held in name of defendant’s wife after finding defendant was the true owner).
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defendant committed the offense and whether the value of the property subject to
forfeiture exceeds the value of the restrained funds.62
Filing a lis pendens
A lis pendens is not a restraint.  Thus, courts in circuits that do not permit
the pre-trial restraint of substitute assets nevertheless allow the Government to
file a lis pendens on assets that are named as subject to forfeiture in the
indictment, whether they are directly traceable to the underlying offense or not.63
Restraining assets of third parties
Courts continue to hold that property held by third parties may be
restrained to preserve the Government’s interest in the property pending trial. 
For example, in United States v. Bailey,64 a defense attorney dissipated the
forfeitable property that had been transferred to him by his client before the
Government could recover it through forfeiture.  The Eleventh Circuit explained
that the Government could have avoided this result by requesting a pre-trial
restraining order preventing the attorney from dissipating the assets.65
Several years ago, the Seventh Circuit appeared to hold that a court could
not restrain property held by the defendant’s wife because she was not a party to
the criminal case.66  But in Phillips the court explained that there is no problem
67 United States v. Phillips, 434 F.3d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (following Kirschenbaum;
property held in third party’s name may be restrained pretrial if there is probable cause to
believe property will be forfeited from the defendant under the relation back doctrine).  See 21
U.S.C. § 853(c) (providing that the Government’s interest in forfeitable property relates back to
the time of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, thus rendering void any post-offense
transfer of the property from the defendant to a third party). 
68 Id. at 916 (defendant lacked standing to object to restraining order on ground that
property belonged to her husband).
69 United States v. Saccoccia, 354 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) (if defense counsel
accepted a fee paid with forfeitable property when such property was subject to a pretrial
restraining order, counsel may be held in civil or criminal contempt)
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restraining property held in the name of a third party if the Government has
probable cause to believe that the property will be forfeited from the defendant
under the relation back doctrine once he is convicted.67
In the same case, the court also held that the defendant lacked standing to
object to the  restraining order on the ground that the property belonged to her
husband.68  Property rights are personal; the defendant has the right to object to
the restraint of her own property but not that of a third party. 
Violating the restraining order
Several years ago, in United States v. Saccoccia,69 the First Circuit held
that a defense attorney who accepts a fee from a defendant after the defendant’s
property has been restrained may be held in contempt of court.  The case
involved a Rhode Island gold dealer who was convicted of money laundering and
ordered to forfeit nearly $140 million in laundered funds.  Following up on the
court’s suggestion, the Government brought a civil contempt action against
several defense attorneys who had accepted fees from the defendant after he
was found guilty and while a restraining order against his property was still in
effect.  The district court entered the contempt order, but in 2005 the First Circuit
vacated the order on appeal.
The decision turned not on forfeiture law but on the law governing civil
contempt.  For a person to be found in contempt of a restraining order, the panel
said, the court must find that the order was “clear and unambiguous.”  In this
case, the order restrained the defendant and his associates from transferring
$140 million to any third party, but it did not say that all of the defendant’s assets
were restrained.  There was evidence in the record indicating that the defense
70 United States v. Saccoccia, 433 F.3d 19, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2005) (a person may not be
found in civil contempt of a restraining order unless it clearly and unambiguously identifies the
property restrained; defense attorney who accepted fees from defendant after court issued
order restraining “$140 million in U.S. Currency” could not be found in contempt because the
order did not clearly state that all of defendant’s assets were restrained or that the attorney was
required to prove that the fee came from unrestrained assets).
71 See In Re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bollin, 264
F.3d 391, 421 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ivanchukov, 405 F. Supp.2d 708, 713 n.9, 
(E.D. Va. 2005) (substitute assets may be restrained before they are paid to attorney as
attorneys fees); United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 806-07 (E.D. Va. 2005)
(describing split in the circuits and explaining the Fourth Circuit rule as consistent with the
holding that the relation back doctrine applies to substitute assets).
72 Id.
73 F.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a).
74 United States v. Dolney, 2005 WL 1076269 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2005).
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attorneys might have been under the impression that the defendant had other,
unrestrained funds with which he could pay his attorneys.  Accordingly, the court
held, the defense attorneys were not clearly on notice that accepting hundreds of
thousands of dollars in fees from the defendant violated the restraining order.70
Pretrial restraint of substitute assets
In 2005, the courts in the Fourth Circuit continued to hold that all property
subject to forfeiture may be restrained pending trial, whether or not it is directly
traceable to the offense.71  For the most part, courts in the other circuits limit pre-
trial restraining orders to traceable property.72
V.  Indictment
Rule 32.2(a)
Rule 32.2(a) says that there can be no forfeiture unless the defendant was
given notice of the forfeiture in the indictment.73  In United States v. Dolney,74 the
defendant moved to dismiss the forfeiture allegation on the ground that it was
75 Id., at *9 (denying motion to dismiss forfeiture allegation as surplusage; Government
is required by Rule 32.2(a) to include a forfeiture allegation if it intends to seek forfeiture).
76 Id., at *7 (following the Advisory Committee Note; there is no need to itemize the
property subject to forfeiture; the Government need only inform the defendant that it will be
seeking forfeiture in accordance with the statute).
77 Borich v. United States, 2005 WL 1668411 (D. Minn. Jul. 18, 2005).
78 Id., at *2 (forfeiture allegation stating that Government would seek forfeiture of
proceeds of defendant’s drug trafficking activity was sufficient; it was not necessary to name
two vehicles as subject to forfeiture).
79 See United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969 n.19 (11th Cir. 1985) (Rule
7(c)(2) does not require notice to defendant that he will be subject to a money judgment);
United States v. Tedder, 2003 WL 23204849, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 28, 2003) (forfeiture
allegation need not make specific reference to the possibility that the forfeiture will take the
form of a money judgment), aff’d, 403 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2005).
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surplusage, but the court held that the allegation was required by the Rule and
thus could not be considered surplusage.75
The property subject to forfeiture need not be itemized
Dolney also held that the Government does not have to list the forfeitable
property in the indictment.  A forfeiture allegation that simply tracks the language
of the forfeiture statute without itemizing the property subject to forfeiture is not
unconstitutionally vague, the court said.  All the Government is required to do is
to notify the defendant that it will be seeking forfeiture in accordance with the
statute.76
Another court said the same thing in United States v. Borich.77  In that
case, the court held that as long as the indictment put the defendant on notice
that the Government would be seeking to forfeit the proceeds of the offense, it
was unnecessary to list specifically the two vehicles that the Government
intended to forfeit as property traceable to the proceeds of the offense.78
Specifying the amount of the money judgment
Similarly, it has long been the rule that the indictment need not inform the
defendant that the indictment could take the form of a money judgment.79  If the
Government does not have to mention the possibility of a money judgment, then
surely  it does not have to specify the amount of the money judgment either.  But
80 See United States v. Pantelidis, 2005 WL 1320135, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 1, 2005) (if
the Government specifies an amount subject to forfeiture in the indictment, it is “stuck with the
number it chose” and cannot seek a different amount following conviction). But see United
States v. Descent, 292 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 2002) (because forfeiture is part of sentencing,
modification of amount Government is seeking as money judgment is not an improper
amendment to the indictment).
81 United States v. Liersch, No. 04CR02521 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2005).
82 United States v. Liersch, No. 04CR02521, slip op. at 18 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2005) (a
prosecution for an offense must be brought before the applicable statute of limitations expires,
but because forfeiture is not a separate offense, but is only part of the punishment for an
offense, a forfeiture allegation may be added by way of a superseding indictment after the
statute of limitations has expired).
83 F.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1).
84 United States v. Dolney, 2005 WL 1076269, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005) (denying
defendant’s motion to combine guilt and forfeiture phases; Rule 32.2(b) makes clear that the
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a district court decision from Pennsylvania provides a cautionary note to
prosecutors:  if the Government does choose to specify the amount of the money
judgment, the court said, it may be stuck with the number it chose.80
Statute of limitations
An indictment charging a defendant with an offense must be returned
within the statute of limitations.  In United States v. Liersch,81 the indictment was
returned with in that period, but the Government then decided to supersede the
indictment to add a forfeiture allegation after the limitations period expired.  The
court held that that was proper because the forfeiture was only part of the
punishment for the offense already charged and not a new substantive offense.82
VI. Trial
Bifurcated Proceeding
Under Rule 32.2(b), the criminal trial must be bifurcated into guilt and
forfeiture phases.83  In Dolney, the defendant who wanted the forfeiture allegation
dismissed as surplusage also wanted to combine the guilt and forfeiture phases
of the trial.  His argument was that combining the forfeiture with the guilt phase
would mean that the reasonable doubt standard who have to apply to the
forfeiture, but the court held that the Rule requires a bifurcated proceeding.84  As
trial must be bifurcated).
85 Id., at *10 (“bifurcating the determinations of guilt and forfeiture ensures that the jury
is neither distracted nor influenced by considerations of the defendants’ potential punishment”).
86 See United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“it is
well-settled in the Second Circuit that once the defendant is convicted of an offense on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the  Government is only required to establish the forfeitability of the
property…by a preponderance of the evidence”).
87 United States v. Reiner, 397 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D. Me. 2005).
88 United States v. Reiner, 397 F. Supp. 2d 101, 108-09 (D. Me. 2005) (in cases where
criminal forfeiture is sought under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), the standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence, but the standard for forfeiture of prostitution proceeds under
18 U.S.C. § 2253 is beyond a reasonable doubt).
89 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
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the court explained, bifurcation simplifies the jury instructions and makes sure
that the jury determining the defendant’s guilt is not influenced by the potential
punishment.85
Burden of Proof
Courts continue to hold that because forfeiture is part of sentencing, the
Government’s burden is to establish the forfeitability of the property by a
preponderance of the evidence, unless the statute says otherwise.86 One
example of the exception to the rule was noted by the district court in United
States v. Reiner,87 where the Government was required to establish the
forfeitability of property under the child pornography statute beyond a reasonable
doubt.88
Application of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker to criminal forfeiture
A year ago, it was unclear whether the case law upholding the
preponderance standard would survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker.89
We now have the answer: every court addressing the question has held that
Booker does not apply to criminal forfeiture.
90 United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 2005).
91 Fruchter, 411 F.3d at ___, citing Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258. In its 2006 amendment
to 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), Congress made § 3554 applicable to all criminal forfeitures.
92 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
93 United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d at 383.  See United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d
752, ___ (8th Cir. Feb. 10, 2006) (Booker does not apply to criminal forfeiture); United States
v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Hall, 411 F.3d 651, 654-
55 (6th Cir. 2005) (same, following Tedder; Booker merely extended Apprendi to the
sentencing guidelines and redefined what constitutes the statutory maximum, but the
guidelines do not apply to forfeiture, and the forfeiture statutes contain no statutory maximum;
forfeiture is a form of indeterminate sentencing “which has never presented a Sixth
Amendment problem”); United States v. Washington, 131 Fed. Appx. 976, 977 (5th Cir. 2005)
(neither Blakely nor Booker overrule the holding in Libretti that there is no Sixth Amendment
right to a jury on the forfeiture issues in a criminal case); United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d
520, 526 (7th Cir. 2005) (following Messino and Vera; forfeiture and restitution do not fall within
Apprendi because there is no statutory maximum); United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220,
224 (1st Cir. 2005) (remanding for resentencing in light of Booker, but affirming the forfeiture);
United States v. Melendez, 401 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2005) (same; under Vera, forfeitures are
open-ended so that all property representing drug proceeds is forfeitable); United States v.
Reiner, 393 F. Supp. 2d 52, 57 (D. Me. 2005) (following Fruchter and Hall; because criminal
forfeiture has no statutory maximum, and because the sentencing guidelines expressly state
that they do not apply to forfeiture, Apprendi and Booker do not apply); United States v.
McKinnon, 2005 WL 2035227, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 26, 2005) (following Fruchter and Messino;
Apprendi and Booker do not apply to criminal forfeiture);   United States v. Anderson, 2005 WL
1027174, at *1 (D. Neb. May 2, 2005) (nothing in Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker alters the
holding in Libretti that there is no constitutional right to a jury with respect to the forfeiture in a
criminal case); United States v. Dolney, 2005 WL 1076269, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2005)
(because forfeiture is mandatory following the finding of guilt, the process of identifying assets
for forfeiture does not threaten to exceed the statutory maximum but rather “will impose a
punishment that has already been authorized by the jury’s verdict;” thus, Apprendi, Blakely, and
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The case that analyzed the issue most thoroughly was the Second Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Fruchter.90 In Booker, the panel noted, the Supreme
Court expressly stated that its decision would not affect criminal forfeiture under
18 U.S.C. § 3554 – the forfeiture provision for drug and racketeering offenses.91
Moreover, Booker and the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Blakely v.
Washington,92 the panel said, apply only to “determinate sentencing” systems –
i.e., situations where the jury verdict of guilt limits the court to imposing a
sentence within a narrow range determined by the legislature.  In contrast,
criminal forfeiture is the quintessential “indeterminate sentencing” system; the
jury’s finding of guilt renders all of the property involved in the offense is subject
to forfeiture.93
Apprendi do not apply to forfeiture); United States v. Upton, 352 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D. Mass.
2005) (following Messino; Blakely does require reasonable doubt instruction for criminal
forfeiture under section 982(a)(1)).
94 Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995) (“the nature of criminal forfeiture as
an aspect of sentencing compels the conclusion that the right to a jury verdict on forfeitability
does not fall within the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional protection”).
95 F.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(4).
96 See United States v. Anderson, 2005 WL 1027174, at *1 (D. Neb. May 2, 2005)
(defendant waived his statutory right to a jury when he remained silent while the jury was
excused).
97 See United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting
without discussion that the parties waived the jury).
98 United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Right to a Jury
The Supreme Court held in Libretti v. United States that there is no Sixth
Amendment right to have the forfeiture determined by a jury.94  Whatever right the
defendant has to have the jury determine the forfeiture is statutory.  The statute,
of course, is Rule 32.2(b)(4).95
To invoke his right to have the jury retained under the Rule, the defendant
must make a specific request.  If he sits on his hands while the jury is being
excused, he waives his right to have the jury determine the forfeiture.96  As it
turns out, in most cases the parties agree to waive the jury.97
That much is clear; what is not clear is whether the right to a jury under
Rule 32.2(b)(4) applies to all aspects of the forfeiture, including determining the
amount of the money judgment, or only to the “nexus” question – i.e., to
determining whether the specific property subject to forfeiture was derived from or
used to commit the offense.  In 2005, two courts took the narrower view, holding
that Rule 32.2(b)(4) does not apply to the calculation of the amount of the money
judgment.
In United States v. Tedder,98 the defendant complained that the court had
deprived him of his statutory right to have the jury determine the amount of the
money judgment when it recalculated the amount without sending the case back
99 United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d at 841 (the defendant’s right under Rule 32.2(b)(4)
is to have the jury determine if the Government has established the required nexus between
the property and his crime; the rule does not give the defendant the right to have the jury
determine the amount of a money judgment).
100 United States v. Reiner, 393 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D. Me. 2005).
101 See United States v. Reiner, 393 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54-57 (D. Me. 2005) (Rule
32.2(b)(4) applies only when the Government is required to establish a nexus between the
property and the offense; when the Government is seeking only a money judgment, there is
no nexus requirement and thus no nexus for the jury to find).
102 United States v. Gaskin, 2002 WL 459005, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2002) (in the
forfeiture phase of the trial, the parties may offer evidence not already in the record; because
forfeiture is part of sentencing, such evidence may include reliable hearsay), aff’d, 364 F.3d
438 (2d Cir. 2004).
103 United States v. Ivanchukov, 404 F. Supp.2d 708, 709 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2005) (because
forfeiture is part of sentencing, reliable hearsay is admissible to establish the forfeitability of the
property).
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to the jury.  On appeal, Seventh Circuit held that because Rule 32.2(b)(4) applies
only to the nexus question, the defendant had no right to have the jury determine
the money judgment and hence no such right was violated when the district court
made the calculation itself.99
In United States v. Reiner,100 the defendant requested that the jury be
retained to determine the amount of the money judgment.  Following Tedder, the
court denied the request.101
No other court has addressed this issue.
Use of hearsay
There still is very little law regarding the rules of evidence that apply in the
forfeiture phase of the trial.  The leading case is the Second Circuit’s affirmance
in 2004 of the district court’s decision in United States v. Gaskin,102 holding that
because forfeiture is part of sentencing, the forfeiture may be based on reliable
hearsay. In 2005, a district court reached the same conclusion in United States v.
Ivanchukov.103
Reliance on evidence from “guilt phase”
104 See United States v. Merold, 46 Fed. Appx. 957 (Table)(11th Cir. 2002) (affirming
district court’s conclusion that jury may rely on evidence admitted in the guilt phase of the
trial).
105 United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
106 United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (under Rule
32.2(b)(1), the court determines the amount of the money judgment, or whether there is a
sufficient nexus between the property and the offense of conviction, based on evidence in the
record of the criminal trial or evidence presented at a hearing after the verdict).
107 United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.  2005).
108 Id. at 15 (explaining that the primary purpose of Rule 32.2(b)(2) was to preserve the
resources of the court and third parties by deferring the ownership issue to the ancillary
proceeding, thus avoiding duplicative litigation).
109 United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005) (district court properly
instructed jury that questions of ownership “were not before them”; therefore, jury’s return of
special verdict of forfeiture says nothing about the ownership of the property).
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Another issue on which there is little law is the extent to which the court
can rely on evidence from the guilt phase of the trial to determine the forfeiture.104
In United States v. Schlesinger,105 the district court addressed the issue and held
that under Rule 32.2(b)(1), the court may determine the forfeiture based on
evidence already in the record or on evidence presented in the forfeiture phase of
the trial.106
“Ownership” vs. “nexus”
Rule 32.2 makes clear that determining the extent of the defendant’s
ownership interest in the forfeited property vis à vis third parties is deferred to the
post-trial ancillary proceeding.  Thus, in the forfeiture phase of the trial the jury
determines the nexus between the property and the offense, but it does not
determine whether the defendant was the owner of the property.  As the First
Circuit explained in United States v. Yeje-Cabrera,107 this conserves judicial
resources by avoiding the duplicative litigation that would occur if the defendant,
or a third party, could contest the entry of the forfeiture order on ownership
grounds at trial and the third party could raise the same issues again in the
ancillary proceeding.108
Thus, in United States v. Nava, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
properly instructed the jury that questions of ownership were not before them.109
110 United States v. Schlesinger, 369 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(defendants cannot object that the property did not belong to them; the extent of the
defendants’ interest in the property and any other party’s interest is decided in the ancillary
proceeding, not when the court is deciding whether to issue a preliminary order of forfeiture). 
Cf. Borich v. United States, 2005 WL 1668411, at *2 (D. Minn. Jul. 18, 2005) (denying
defendant’s section 2255 petition on the ground that defendant lacked standing to object to a
forfeiture on the ground that the forfeited vehicles had been transferred to a third party).
111 United States v. McKinnon, 2005 WL 2035227 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 26, 2005).
112 Id., at *15 (denying motion for judgment of acquittal on the forfeiture allegation on
the ground that the jury’s special verdict was against the weight of the evidence).  See United
States v. Wittig, 2006 WL 13158, at *8 (D. Kan. Jan. 3, 2006) (granting in part and denying in
part defendant’s Rule 29(c) motion to set aside the forfeiture verdict on the ground that the
forfeiture was not supported by the evidence; the question is whether a reasonable jury could
conclude that the Government has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
property is subject to forfeiture).
113 United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2005).
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And in United States v. Schlesinger, the district court held that the defendant
could not object to the forfeiture on the ground that the property did not belong to
him at the time he used it to commit a money laundering offense.110
Motion for judgment of acquittal
Few courts have discussed whether a forfeiture verdict is subject to a
motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29.  In United States v.
McKinnon,111 the district court seems to have assumed that such a motion was
proper, but held that the verdict was supported by the evidence.   The defendant
drug dealer’s lavish lifestyle, lack of legitimate income, and his efforts to conceal
his money from law enforcement, the court said, amply supported the jury’s
verdict that $17,500 in seized currency constituted drug proceeds.112
VII.  Money Judgments
It is well-established that a forfeiture order may take the form of a judgment
for a sum of money.  Such orders are common in cases where the defendant did
not retain, or the Government is unable to locate, the property involved in the
underlying offense.  For example, in United States v. Huber,113 a massive fraud
and money laundering case from North Dakota, the Eighth Circuit held that the
Government was entitled to a money judgment for the amount of money that the
114 Id. at 1056 (“Forfeiture under section 982(a)(1) in a money laundering case allows the
Government to obtain a money judgment representing the value of all property ‘involved in’ the
offense, including the money or other property being laundered (the corpus) and any property
used to facilitate the laundering offense”; in a conspiracy case, the corpus is the funds the
defendant conspired to launder, including commingled clean money).
115 See United States v. Bermudez, 413 F.3d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2005) (court orders
money launderer to pay $14.2 million—the value of the funds laundered—even though he
forwarded the money to third parties); United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836, 840-41 (7th Cir.
2005) (affirming order of forfeiture comprising $1.7 million in property involved in money
laundering and $1.1 million in the form of a personal money judgment); United States v. Ryder,
414 F.3d 908, 913 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting without discussion that defendant convicted of money
laundering was ordered to pay $136,301 money judgment per section 982(a)(1) and Rule
32.2(b)(3)); United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(Government is entitled to a money judgment for the total amount of money defendant
laundered through his business); United States v. Reiner,  393 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55 n.9 (D. Me.
2005) (noting that notwithstanding the footnote in the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 32.2
that the committee takes no position on the availability of a money judgment, the rule clearly
spells out the procedure for obtaining a money judgment, and the First Circuit has just as
clearly affirmed one in Candelaria-Silva); United States v. Weiss, 2005 WL 1126663, at *13
(M.D. Fla. May 6, 2005) (jury returns special verdict for $3.1 million money judgment reflecting
the proceeds of defendant’s racketeering activity).
116 United States v. Croce, 334 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (Croce I).
117 Id. at 794 (disagreeing with all precedents and holding that section 982(a)(1)
authorizes the forfeiture of specific assets only), on reconsideration, 345 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495-
96 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (Croce II) (section 982(a)(1) authorizes money judgments but only up to the
value of assets that may be forfeited as substitute assets; it does not authorize money
judgments that exceed the defendant’s net worth).
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defendant conspired to launder, even if some of the laundered money ended up
in the hands of third parties.114  There were a plethora of such cases in 2005.115
In United States v. Croce,116 however, a district court in Pennsylvania
questioned the wisdom of the established law and held that a forfeiture judgment
must be limited to the value of the assets in the defendant’s possession at the
time the judgment is entered.117  That case is still pending on appeal, but
defendants in other cases have urged the court to follow Croce and decline to
enter a forfeiture order in the form of a money judgment if the defendant no
longer has possession of the property derived from the offense or other property
that may be forfeited as substitute assets.  
118 United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2006).
119
 Id. at 59 (the district court may order the defendant to forfeit a sum of money equal to
the drug proceeds that he earned but did not retain; this reflects the nature of criminal forfeiture
as “a sanction against the individual defendant rather than a judgment against the property
itself,” and is the only way to truly separate the wrongdoer from the fruits of his crime once he
has spent them on “wine, women and song”).
120 Id. at 60 n.8 (rejecting defendant’s argument that district court could not enter a
money judgment and order forfeiture of specific assets as part of the same order, order that
included a money judgment for $511,321 and ordered the forfeiture of specific items of
personal and real property in accordance with the jury’s special verdict was proper).
121 United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (“a money judgment permits the
Government to collect on the forfeiture order in the same way that a successful plaintiff collects
a money judgment from a civil defendant;” “even if a defendant does not have sufficient funds
to cover the forfeiture at the time of the conviction, the Government may seize future assets to
satisfy the order; rejecting Croce) (emphasis added).
122 United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 970 (7th Cir. 2000) (a forfeiture order may
include a money judgment for the amount of money involved in the money laundering offense;
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In United States v. Hall,118 for example, the defendant in a drug case
contested the district court’s authority to impose a $511,000 money judgment on
the ground that it greatly exceeded the amount of money he had available to
satisfy the judgment at the time of sentencing.  The district court rejected the
argument and the First Circuit affirmed the decision on appeal.
Expressly rejecting the analysis in Croce, the panel said that the authority
to impose a money judgment follows from the nature of criminal forfeiture as a
sanction against the individual defendant and not against the property.  If the
court did not have the authority to impose a money judgment, the court said,
there would be no effective sanction against a defendant who had spent the
proceeds on wine, women and song.119  Moreover, the court held that there is
nothing wrong with a forfeiture order that includes both a money judgment and an
order forfeiting specific assets in the same order.120
Most important, the Court of Appeals expressly rejected the view in Croce
that a money judgment cannot remain hanging over the defendant’s head
indefinitely and must therefore be limited to the value of the defendant’s assets at
the time the judgment is entered.  The money judgment places the Government
in the same position as any other judgment creditor, the court said, and it remains
in effect until satisfied.121 This is consistent with what the Seventh Circuit said
several years ago in United States v. Baker.122
the money judgment acts as a lien against the defendant personally for the duration of his
prison term and beyond).  Accord United States v. Delco Wire and Cable Co., Inc., 772 F.
Supp. 1511, 1517 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (criminal forfeiture is “like a money judgment that runs
against the defendant until satisfied in full”).
123 F.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(2).
124 United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.  2005) 
125 Id. at 15.
126 United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2005).
127 Id. at 275 n.1.
128 See United States v. Elliott, 149 Fed. Appx. 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendant had
to appeal from the preliminary order forfeiting his house as a substitute asset, not from the final
order denying third party claims to the property).
129 See United States v. Hicks, 2005 WL 2656594, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2005)
(because forfeiture is part of sentencing, it may only be challenged on direct appeal; once the
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VIII.  Preliminary Order of Forfeiture 
Rule 32.2(b)(2)123 provides that the court must enter a preliminary order of
forfeiture “promptly” after determining what property is subject to forfeiture. Two
new cases describe the history and purpose of the Rule.  In United States v.
Yeje-Cabrera,124 the First Circuit explained that the predecessor to Rule 32.2(b)
was amended in 1996 to allow the court to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture
before sentencing to avoid delays in the forfeiture process including the resolution
of  third party rights in the ancillary proceeding.125  In United States v. Bennett,126
the Third Circuit described the procedures required by Rule 32.2(b) in detail, and
explained that the order of forfeiture remains preliminary as to the defendant until
sentencing,  and remains preliminary as to third parties until the ancillary
proceeding is concluded.127
There are a number of consequences that flow from the fact that the order
of forfeiture becomes final as to the defendant at sentencing.  Because forfeiture
is part of sentencing, defendants must appeal from the order of forfeiture at the
same time they appeal their conviction; they may not wait until it is final as to third
parties.128  By the same token, once the forfeiture becomes final as to the
defendant at sentencing, it cannot be revised by the district court, except as
provided in Rules 35(a) and 36, other than to account for third party rights in the
ancillary proceeding.129
time for appeal has expired, the forfeiture is final and cannot be revised by the district court). 
But see United States v. Croce, 355 F. Supp. 2d 774, 778 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (Croce III)
(preliminary order does not become final as to the defendant until after the ancillary proceeding;
therefore, the district court retains inherent authority to make a substantive change to an order
of forfeiture after the 7-day period set forth in Rule 35 has expired).
130 United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (“Congress could not have
chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the
statute applied…”).
131 See United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (“At sentencing, the
district court must order forfeiture of the property in addition to imposing any other sentence.”);
United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2005) (forfeiture is mandatory and not
limited by the maximum statutory fine; forfeiture is to be imposed in addition to, not in lieu of, a
fine).
132 United States v. Ivanchukov, 405 F. Supp.2d 708, 711 n.6 (E.D. Va. Dec. 22, 2005).
133 F.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(3).
134 United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 281 (3rd Cir. 2005) (district court erred in not
making forfeiture part of the oral announcement of sentence; Rule 32.2(b)(3) requires it).
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IX.  Order of Forfeiture / Sentencing
Forfeiture is mandatory
In Monsanto, the Supreme Court made it clear that criminal forfeiture is
mandatory.130  In 2005, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits reiterated that point in two
drug cases, pointing out that at sentencing, the district court must order the
forfeiture in addition to imposing any other sentence.131 The district court in
United States v. Ivanchukov held that the point applied equally to forfeitures for
alien smuggling and visa fraud under § 982(a)(6).132
Forfeiture must be included in the oral announcement of the sentence
Rule 32.2(b)(3) provides that the forfeiture must be made part of the
sentence and included in the judgment.133  In Bennett, the Third Circuit held that
this means that the forfeiture must be part of he oral announcement of the
sentence.134  In the circumstances of that case, however, the panel held that the
district court’s failure to make reference to the forfeiture at sentencing was not
fatal.  
135 Id. at 282.
136 United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2002).
137 Id. at 1284 (district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture 6
months after defendant was sentenced even though the judgment and commitment order said
defendant “was subject to forfeiture as cited in count two”; the scheme set forth in Rule 32.2 is
“detailed and comprehensive”).
138 United States v. King, 368 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.S.C. 2005).
139 Id. at 512 (following Petrie; where there was no mention of forfeiture either at
sentencing or in the judgment, there is a clear violation of Rule 32.2(b) that cannot be corrected
16 days after sentencing as a clerical error; distinguishing cases where court issued the order
before sentencing but simply forgot to make it part of the judgment).
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In Bennett, a defendant who was convicted by a jury of a
methamphetamine offense, stipulated to the forfeiture of certain property. 
Relying on the stipulation, the court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture, but
forgot to refer to the forfeiture at sentencing.  When the defendant challenged the
forfeiture on appeal, the panel concluded that because the defendant was clearly
aware of the forfeiture, the district court’s failure to include the forfeiture in the
oral announcement of the sentence did not deprive the defendant of his rights
under the Rule.135
The order of forfeiture must be entered prior to or at the time of sentencing 
The requirement in Rule 32.2(b)(3) that the forfeiture be made part of the
sentence also means that if the district court has not already entered a
preliminary order of forfeiture as provided in Rule 32.2(b)(2), it must enter an
order of forfeiture at the time sentencing itself.  As a general rule, if the district
court fails to enter an order of forfeiture by the time the defendant is sentenced,
the forfeiture is void.
The seminal case on this issue was the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 2002
in United States v. Petrie,136 which held that a district court had no jurisdiction to
enter an order of forfeiture for the first time 6 months after the defendant was
sentenced.137  A district court in South Carolina reached the same result in 2005
in United States v. King.138  Following Petrie, the court held that it was powerless
to correct the sentence to include an order of forfeiture 16 days after sentencing,
even though the defendant had agreed to the forfeiture in his guilty plea.139
140 United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (Rule 32.2(b)(3)’s
requirement that the forfeiture be part of the sentence ensures that all aspects of the
defendant’s sentence are part of a single package that is imposed at one time).
141 But see United States v. King, 368 F. Supp. 2d 509, 511-12 (D.S.C. 2005) (even if
timely filed, a Rule 35(a) motion cannot be used to obtain an order of forfeiture that should have
been entered at or prior to sentencing in accordance with Rule 32.2(b)(2) and (3) because such
omission is not an “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error”). 
142 United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2005) (the order of forfeiture
does not become final as to the defendant and become part of the judgment automatically; the
court must comply with Rule 32.2(b)(3); a “final order of forfeiture” that is not entered until after
sentencing is a nullity).
143 Because the entry of an order of forfeiture is mandatory, the Government may
appeal any sentence that omits an order of forfeiture as “illegal” under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
See United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (Corrado I) (the Government
may appeal from district court’s refusal to enter forfeiture judgment; because forfeiture is
mandatory, such refusal constitutes a sentence imposed in violation of law for which appeal is
authorized under section 3742(b)).
144 F.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(3).
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As the First Circuit explained in Yeje-Cabrera, the purpose of the Rule is to
ensure that all aspects of the defendant’s sentence are part of a single package
that is imposed at one time.140  If the district court fails to enter any order of
forfeiture before or at the time of sentencing, and makes no statement regarding
the forfeiture in the oral announcement of the sentence, the sentence becomes
final without the forfeiture, except to the extent that it may be corrected within 7
days pursuant to Rule 35(a).141  As the Third Circuit said in Bennett, a final order
of forfeiture that is not entered until after sentencing is a “nullity.”142
Accordingly, if the court completely omits to enter an order of forfeiture
before sentencing, there can be no criminal forfeiture in the case, unless the
Government files a timely appeal.143
The forfeiture order must be made part of the judgment
Rule 32.2(b)(3) also provides that the order of forfeiture must be included in
the judgment.144  This raises a separate issue that several courts have had to
address: What happens if the court enters a preliminary order of forfeiture, but
forgets to append it to the judgment and commitment order (the “J&C”)?  The
courts are split on this question.
145 See United States v. Loe, 248 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (if district court forgets to
include forfeiture in the judgment, it may, pursuant to Rule 36 amend the judgment nunc pro
tunc; even if the judgment is not so amended, oral pronouncement of the forfeiture at the
sentencing hearing is sufficient to comply with former Rule 32(d)(2)); United States v. Hatcher,
323 F.3d 666, 673 (8th Cir. 2003) (if there was a preliminary order of forfeiture, the failure to
include the forfeiture in the judgment or in the oral pronouncement at sentencing is a clerical
error that may be corrected at any time pursuant to Rule 36); United States v. Thomas, 67 Fed.
Appx. 819, 820 (4th Cir. 2003) (amendment of the judgment pursuant to Rule 36 to include the
forfeiture judgment 4 years after sentencing was appropriate as it accurately reflected the
district court’s intention at sentencing).
146 See United States v. Pease, 331 F.3d 809, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2003) (the omission of
the order of forfeiture from the judgment in a criminal case is not a clerical error that can be
corrected pursuant to Rule 36; if the district court does not make the order of forfeiture part of
the judgment at sentencing, and the Government does not appeal, the forfeiture is void); United
States v. Arevalo, 67 Fed. Appx. 589 (Table) (11th Cir. 2003) (preliminary order of forfeiture
becomes final at sentence automatically; the failure to memorialize that in writing by making the
forfeiture part of the judgment is a clerical error that may be corrected pursuant to Rule 36);
United States v. Arevalo, 2004 WL 1253057, at *1 (11th  Cir. May 13, 2004) (reaffirming original
holding and distinguishing Pease on the ground that the court in Arevalo apprized the
defendant of the forfeiture orally at sentencing).
147 United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 279-81 (3d Cir. 2005) (if there was a
preliminary order of forfeiture to which defendant did not object, the failure to include the
forfeiture in both the oral pronouncement and the judgment and commitment order is a clerical
error that may be corrected pursuant to Rule 36) (collecting cases).
148 See United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.  2005)  (the portion of
Rule 32.2(b)(3) requiring the court to make the forfeiture part of the judgment is “largely a
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Between 2001 and 2004, the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits held that the
failure to append the order of forfeiture to the J&C was a clerical error that could
be corrected at any time pursuant to Rule 36.145  The Eleventh Circuit, on the
other hand, held that the omission could be considered a clerical error only if the
forfeiture was made part of the oral announcement of the sentence; otherwise,
the court said, it must be regarded as a fatal error that could only be corrected if
the Government filed a timely appeal.146
This division continued in 2005.  In Bennett, the Third Circuit held that the
failure to append the order of forfeiture to the J&C was a clerical error subject to
correction under Rule 36 even though the district court did not mention the
forfeiture in the oral announcement of the sentence.147  On the other hand, in
Yeje-Cabrera the First Circuit held that the error was clerical only because the
forfeiture order was issued in writing and made part of the oral announcement at
sentencing.148  Moreover, in United States v. Robinson,149 the Eleventh Circuit
housekeeping rule and does not itself go to any fundamental rights of defendants”; the error
may be corrected pursuant to Rule 36, but only if there was a preliminary order of forfeiture and
the forfeiture was included in the oral announcement).
149 United States v. Robinson, 137 Fed. Appx. 273, 276-77 (11th Cir. 2005).
150 United States v. Pease, 331 F.3d 809, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2003).
151 United States v. Robinson, 2005 WL 1509120, at *3 (11th Cir. Jun. 27, 2005)
(refusing to reconsider Pease and refusing to consider a preliminary order of forfeiture self-
executing when it states that it will be made part of the judgment, but granting the
Government’s appeal and remanding with instructions to include the forfeiture in the judgment).
See also United States v. Davis, 151 Fed. Appx. 880, 881 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying Rule 60(b)
motion for return of criminally forfeited property on the ground that the order of forfeiture was
not included in the J&C; Rule 60(b) is a civil rule that does not apply in criminal cases and
therefore cannot be used to challenge a criminal forfeiture order).
152 United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2005).
153 United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2005).
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held once again that the error was not clerical and could not be corrected under
Rule 36 if the forfeiture was not mentioned in the oral announcement.  In that
case, the panel reaffirmed the holding in United States v. Pease150 that the
Government’s only remedy was to appeal, but the court then granted the appeal
and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to include the
forfeiture in the judgment.151
X.  Joint and Several Liability
Liability for the amount subject to forfeiture
Defendants who are convicted of a criminal offense are jointly and
severally liable for the forfeiture of the total amount of money derived from that
offense.  For example, in United States v. Fruchter, the Second Circuit held that a
RICO defendant was liable for the forfeiture of all proceeds of the offense
foreseeable to him, including proceeds traceable to conduct committed by others
on which the defendant was personally acquitted.152
Generally, as Fruchter illustrates, the only limitation on a given defendant’s
liability is the amount of forfeiture that was foreseeable to that defendant; the
defendant’s liability is not limited to the amount of benefit that he or she may have
received personally.  But in United States v. Spano,153 the court suggested that
154 Id. at 603 (all coconspirators are jointly and severally liable for the amount of the
forfeiture regardless of how much or how little they benefitted from the conspiracy; suggesting,
but not deciding, that a defendant’s liability may not be limited to the amount foreseeable to that
defendant).
155 United States v. Reiner, 397 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D. Me. 2005).
156 Id. at 108, 110 (“principles of vicarious liability for forfeiture by coconspirators extend
equally to an aider and abettor”; person who did not receive prostitution proceeds is liable for
forfeiture under section 2253 for the amount received by a third party).
157 United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 n.19 (E.D. Va. 2005) (because
defendant, unlike his codefendants, is charged only with fraud and not with money laundering,
his joint and several liability is limited to the amounts involved in the fraud and cannot include
amounts involved only in the money laundering).
158 See United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 1995) (the Government can
collect the total amount subject to forfeiture only once, but subject to that cap, it can collect
from any defendant so much of that amount as was foreseeable to that defendant).
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even the foreseeability requirement may not exist in the Seventh Circuit.  In that
case, the panel suggested that the joint and several liability of co-conspirators in
a forfeiture case might be analogous to partnership liability for debts in the
business context which does not depend on the foreseeability of the debt to a
given partner.154
In United States v. Reiner,155 a district court in Maine held that joint and
several liability applies to a defendant who was convicted as an aider and abettor. 
In that case, the defendant aided the commission of a sex trafficking offense by
managing a health club that served as the cover for a prostitution business, but
did not personally participate in any of the illegal acts and did not receive any of
the prostitution proceeds.  Nevertheless, the defendant was liable to forfeit the
amounts received by third parties.156
While joint and several forfeiture liability is extensive, it is not unlimited.  In
United States v. Wingerter, the district court cautioned that the joint and several
liability theory cannot be used to make a defendant liable for amounts involved in
offenses for which he was not convicted.157
Credit for amounts forfeited by others
Each defendant is entitled to credit for the amount forfeited by his or her
co-defendants if they have been found jointly and severally liable for the forfeiture
of the same property.158  But as the Seventh Circuit noted in Tedder, a defendant
159 United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2005).
160 F.R.Crim.P. 32.2(e).
161 United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 60 (1st Cir. 2006) (Rule 32.2(e) allows the
Government to move to forfeit substitute assets, but the court still must order the property
forfeited).
162 See United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 43 (1st Cir. 1999) (forfeiture of
substitute assets is solely a matter for the court; the defendant’s only right is to have the jury
determine the amount of the money judgment, which puts an upper limit on the amount that
may be forfeited as a substitute asset); United States v. Weiss, 2005 WL 1126663, at *12
(M.D. Fla. May 6, 2005) (same; following Candelaria-Silva).
163 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).
164 Borich v. United States, 2005 WL 1668411, at *3 (D. Minn. Jul. 18, 2005)
(defendant’s agreement to forfeit money as a substitute asset made it unnecessary for the
Government to show that it satisfied the “due diligence” requirement in section 853(p)).
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is not entitled to credit for amounts forfeited by his co-defendants where they
were liable to forfeit different property.159
XI.  Substitute Assets
Procedure for obtaining substitute assets
The procedure for amending the order of forfeiture to include substitute
assets is set forth in Rule 32.2(e).160  In Hall, the First Circuit noted that the
Government may move for forfeiture of the substitute asset under the Rule, but it
is up to the court to grant the motion and amend the order.161
On the other hand, it is well-established that the jury has no role in
forfeiting substitute assets.162
The criteria set forth in § 853(p) must be satisfied
The statute authorizing the forfeiture of substitute property is 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(p).  Generally, under that statute, the Government must show that the
directly forfeitable property is unavailable due to some act or omission of the
defendant.163  In Borich, however, the district court held that the defendant’s
stipulation to the forfeiture of substitute assets makes that showing
unnecessary.164
165 See United States v. Weiss, 2005 WL 1126663, at *6-8 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2005) (any
asset of the defendant may be forfeited as a substitute asset to satisfy a money judgment).
166 United States v. Ivanchukov, 405 F. Supp.2d 708, 713 (E.D. Va. 2005) (money that
third party gave defendant in form of bearer check became defendant’s property and thus was
immediately available for forfeiture as substitute asset; that third party intended money to be
used for attorneys fee made no difference).
167 United States v. Bermudez, 413 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 2005).
168 United States v. Bermudez, 413 F.3d at 306-07.  See also United States v. Hall, 134
 F.3d 42, 58 n.7 (1st Cir. 2006) (following Candalaria-Silva; substitute assets may be forfeited
to satisfy a forfeiture order for a sum of money that the defendant, by his act or omission, has
prevented the Government from tracing).
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Any property of the defendant may be forfeited as a substitute asset
The general rule is that any asset of the defendant is fair game to be
forfeited as a substitute asset.165  In Ivanchukov, the defendant asked a co-
defendant for money to help him pay his attorneys fees.  Instead of paying the
attorney directly, the co-defendant gave the defendant a check for $100,000 with
the payee’s name left blank.  The defendant then filled in the name of his
attorney’s law firm and gave the check to the attorney.  When the Government
later moved to forfeit the $100,000, the court held that while the check was in the
defendant’s possession in bearer form it was his money, and thus could be
forfeited as a substitute asset.166
Substitute assets may be forfeited to satisfy money judgment
Courts continue to hold that forfeiting substitute assets is one way of
satisfying a forfeiture order that is in the form of a money judgment.  For example,
in United States v. Bermudez,167 the Second Circuit upheld the forfeiture of
substitute assets in partial satisfaction of a $14.2 million money judgment in a
money laundering case, even though the defendant asserted that he had
laundered the money for a third party and kept none of it for himself.168
The prosecutor can switch theories of forfeiture
169 See United States v. Weiss, 2005 WL 1126663, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2005)
(while the court of appeals' holding barred the government from pursuing the mortgage as
directly forfeitable racketeering proceeds under 1963(a)(3), the mortgage was properly
forfeitable as a substitute asset under 1963(m)).
170 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
171 United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (E.D. Va. 2005) (the issue as
far as Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale is concerned is not whether the property is tainted or
untainted, but whether it is forfeitable or unforfeitable).  See also In re Restraint of Bowman
Gaskins Financial Group Accounts, 345 F. Supp. 2d 613, 627-28 (E.D. Va. 2004) (Monsanto
applies to the pretrial restraint of substitute assets in jurisdictions that permit such restraint;
the defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to object to the pretrial restraint of any property
subject to forfeiture, regardless of the Government’s forfeiture theory, as long as there is
probable cause to support the forfeiture).
172 Wingerter, 369 F. Supp.2d at 807.
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If the jury fails to include an asset in the list of things directly traceable to
the offense, the Government may seek forfeiture of the same asset as a
substitute asset.169
An attorney cannot object that the substitute assets are needed to pay his fee
The fact that the defendant intended to use the substitute asset to pay his
attorney’s fee does not confer any special status on the property.  As the district
court held in Wingerter, the Supreme Court’s decision in Caplin & Drysdale170
applies equally to any forfeitable property, whether it is a substitute asset or
directly forfeitable property.171  In applying the Supreme Court’s decision, the
court said, the issue is not whether the property is tainted or untainted, but
whether it is forfeitable or unforfeitable.172
XII. Property Transferred to Third Parties
The relation back doctrine 
Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), the Government’s interest in forfeitable property
vests at the time of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture.  In United States v.
Nava, the Ninth Circuit held that in the case of a drug conspiracy, the
Government’s interest vests at the onset of the conspiracy that the property
173 United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005).
174 See 21 U.S.C. § § 853(c) and (n)(6)(B).
175 See United States v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2003) (relation back
doctrine applies to substitute assets and vests title in the Government as of the date of the
offense).
176 In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2005).
177 In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 291 (4th Cir. 2005).  Accord United States v.
Ivanchukov, 405 F. Supp.2d 708, 712 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“the Government’s interest in
substitute assets, like its interest in tainted assets, vests at the time the act giving rise to
forfeiture is committed”).
178 See United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, 83 F.3d 660, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Government may file a conversion action in federal court based on Virginia tort law to recover
drug proceeds that defense attorney converted to his own use), rev’d 875 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D.
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facilitated.173  To contest the forfeiture, any third party who acquires an interest in
the forfeited property after that date must be bona fide purchaser.174
Application of relation back doctrine to substitute assets
Third parties have the right to contest the forfeiture of substitute assets in
the ancillary proceeding, but it is unclear when the Government’s interest in
substitute assets vests for purposes of determining whether the third party
challenge must be under section 853(n)(6)(A) or (B).  In 2003, the Fourth Circuit
held that the Government’s interest in substitute assets vests at the time of the
offense, and that a spouse who acquired her interest in the property thereafter
had to establish that she was a bona fide purchaser for value.175  In 2005, the
same court reaffirmed that ruling in In re Bryson.176 Because the Government’s
interest in substitute assets vests at the time of the offense giving rise to the
forfeiture, the court said, a third party must show that he was the real owner of
the property and not a mere nominee at that time, or else show that he acquired
the property thereafter as a bona fide purchaser for value.177
Suing a third party for converting the forfeitable property to his own use
Property transferred to a third party remains subject to forfeiture under the
relation back doctrine as long as the third party retains it, but if the third party has
dissipated the property, the Government’s only remedy is to file a conversion
action against the third party to recover its value.178
Va. 1995).
179 United States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003).
180 United States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d at 1298.
181 United States v. Bailey, 419 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (Government’s
conversion action against defense attorney who converted $2 million in fraud proceeds to his
own use failed because Florida law requires plaintiff to show that it had possession or an
immediate right of possession of the converted property at the time the conversion took place;
the relation back doctrine does not, by itself, satisfy this requirement; the Government has no
right of possession until a court enters an order of forfeiture).
182 419 F.3d at 1216.
183 See United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (“section 853(n) is
the exclusive proceeding in which third parties may claim interests in property subject to
criminal forfeiture”; section 853(k) “specifically bars third parties from intervening in the trial or
the appeal of a criminal case to assert their interests, or from bringing independent suits
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In United States v. McCorkle,179 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Government had the right to file such an action against defense attorney F. Lee
Bailey for converting $2 million in forfeitable fraud proceeds to his own use.180
Following the court’s suggestion, the Government filed such an action but failed
in the district court on the ground that the Government did not satisfy all of the
elements of the Florida tort of conversion.  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the district court; to prevail in a conversion action, the panel said, the
Government must satisfy the requirements of the applicable state tort law,
including the requirement (in Florida) that the Government had a right of
immediate possession of the converted property.  In the panel’s view, the relation
back doctrine did not give the Government that right to immediate possession.181
In other states that have more modern tort laws, the panel said, it is likely
that the Government would have prevailed.182  It will be up to Congress to create
a federal cause of action in such instances so that the Government’s ability to
recover forfeitable property from third parties does not depend on the vagaries of
state law.  
XIII.  Right of a Third Party To Object to the Forfeiture
21 U.S.C. § 853(k) provides that a third party has no right to intervene in a
criminal case to object to the forfeiture until after conviction.  The only avenue for
challenging the forfeiture is the ancillary proceeding.183  For example, as the
against the United States once an indictment alleging that the property is subject to forfeiture
has been filed”); United States v. Puig, 419 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 2005) (the ancillary
proceeding is the “only avenue by which a third party claimant may seek to assert an interest
in property that has been included in an indictment alleging that the property is subject to
forfeiture”).
184 Gatex Corp. v. United States, 2005 WL 821516 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2005).
185 Id., at * 2 (denying Rule 41(g) motion for the return of seized property on the ground
that movant had the adequate remedy of filing a claim in the ancillary proceeding in the
criminal case).
186 United States v. Ivanchukov, 405 F. Supp.2d 708, 713 n.12, (E.D. Va. 2005)
(pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(2), defense attorney cannot contest forfeiture of attorneys fee in the
forfeiture phase of the case, but may do so in the ancillary proceeding).
187 See Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents, 401 F.3d 419, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2005)
(purpose of the ancillary proceeding is solely to determine who has legal right to the forfeited
property; it is not the place for third parties to seek compensation for damages allegedly
resulting from the Government’s seizure of the property); United States v. Perkins, 382 F. Supp.
2d 146, 150 (D. Me. 2005) (claimant to whom defendant owed child support cannot use
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district court held in Gatex Corp. v. United States,184 a third party cannot seek
return of property seized for criminal forfeiture under Rule 41(g) if the remedy of
filing a claim in the ancillary proceeding is available.185
For the same reason, a third party may not object to the Government’s
motion to forfeit substitute assets.  In Ivanchukov, the defense attorney who
received the $100,000 check in bearer form from the defendant tried to object to
the forfeiture of the check as a substitute asset.  But the court held that only the
defendant could object to the forfeiture when the Government moved for the
preliminary order; the attorney, like any other third party, had to wait to make his
objections in the ancillary proceeding.186
XIV.  Ancillary Hearing—Procedural Issues
Purpose of the ancillary proceeding
The purpose of the ancillary proceeding is to adjudicate a third party’s
interest in the property being forfeited, not to adjudicate personal claims against
the defendant.  Accordingly, the courts have consistently turned a deaf ear to
attempts by third parties to use the ancillary proceeding to assert claims for
compensatory damages against the defendant, or to recover debts like child
support payments.187
ancillary proceeding to adjudicate the validity of her debt or her lienholder’s interest in property
not subject to forfeiture).
188 United States v. Puig, 419 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
189 See United States v. Puig, 419 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding it
unnecessary to decide if either the statute or the Due Process Clause requires direct written
notice because claimant had actual notice, but questioning cases holding such notice is
required).
190 419 F.3d at 704 (claimant whose counsel had actual notice of the order of forfeiture
cannot complain that the Government should have sent him direct notice).
191 United States v. Perkins, 382 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D. Me. 2005).
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Notice requirement under section 853(n)(1)
The procedures that govern the ancillary proceeding are set forth in 21
U.S.C. § 853(n) and Rule 32.2(c).  One currently unresolved issue concerning
those procedures is whether the Government is required to send direct written
notice of the forfeiture order to interested third parties, advising them of their right
to contest the forfeiture.  Under Section 853(n)(1), the Government has the option
of sending direct written notice but it is not required to do so.  The issue is
whether, notwithstanding the statute, the Due Process Clause makes the sending
of such direct notice mandatory.   
In United States v. Puig,188 the Eighth Circuit flagged the issue but did not
decide it.189  It held only that a person with actual notice cannot complain that the
Government failed to send him notice.190
Subject matter jurisdiction
The claim in the ancillary proceeding must relate to the property that is
forfeited.  As we will discuss momentarily, an unsecured creditor lacks standing to
contest the a forfeiture in the ancillary proceeding.  It doesn’t do the claimant any
good to say, however, “I’m not just an unsecured creditor; I have an actual lien on
the defendant’s property” if that property is not the property that has been
forfeited.  In United States v. Perkins,191 a third party asserted that she had
converted her right to child support payments into a legal interest in the
defendant’s property, but the court held that because that property was not the
192 United States v. Perkins, 382 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148-49 (D. Me. 2005) (third party
must assert an interest in the forfeited property; court has no jurisdiction to litigate claimant’s
lien against other property of defendant not being forfeited).
193 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3).
194 United States v. Perkins, 382 F. Supp. 2d 146, 147 (D. Me. 2005) (court gives pro
se claimant 2 weeks to conform her petition to section 853(n)(3), making the claim under oath
and stating how defendant’s obligation to pay child support gives her a legal interest in the
forfeited property). See also United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2006
WL 211946, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006) (petition filed by counsel and verified by a CPA but
not by the petitioners themselves does not comply with § 853(n)(3); the “substantial danger of
false claims in forfeiture proceedings” requires strict compliance with the requirement that the
claimant sign the petition personally under penalty of perjury).
195 See United States v. Jones, 2005 WL 1806406, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Jul. 27, 2005)
(under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A), court may dismiss third party claim without a hearing for lack of
standing or failure to state a claim, but all facts alleged in the petition must be assumed to be
true); United States v. Wheaton, 2005 WL 2429792, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 25, 2005) (granting
motion to dismiss because petition fails to state a claim sufficient to recover under
section 853(n)(6)(A) or (B) even if all facts are assumed to be true).
196 United States v. Perkins, 382 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148-49 (D. Me. 2005) (claim
dismissed without a hearing where petition asserted an interest in property not being forfeited
and asserted an interest that arose after the Government’s interest vested under the relation
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asset subject to forfeiture, the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim.192
Pleading requirements under section 853(n)(3)
Section 853(n)(3) provides that the third party’s petition must be filed under
penalty of perjury and must describe the Claimant’s interest in the forfeited
property.193  In Perkins, the court gave the pro se claimant two weeks to conform
her petition to the requirements of the statute.194
When no hearing is necessary
Under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A), no hearing is necessary if the court can dismiss
the claim on the pleadings for lack of standing or for failure to state a claim.195  In
Perkins, the court dismissed part of the claim because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, and part of it because even assuming the facts to be true, the
claimant did not have a claim cognizable under § 853(n)(6)(A) because what she
alleged was an interest that arose after the crime giving rise to the forfeiture.196
back doctrine).
197 See United States v. Martinez, 228 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2000) (ancillary hearing
is necessary only where there are facts in dispute that must be resolved; if petitioner’s claim
lacks merit as a matter of law, it can be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment);
Pacheco v. Serendensky, 393 F.3d 348, 356 (2d Cir. 2004) (only after some discovery has
taken place may a party move for summary judgment in the ancillary proceeding).
198 United States v. Harewood, 2005 WL 2076543 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2005).
199
 Id., at *2 (granting Government’s motion for summary judgment where undisputed
facts showed claimant had no interest in forfeited property at the time of the offense and gave
nothing of value in exchange for it).
200 United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the petitioner bears
the burden of proving his right, title, or interest under section 853(n)(6)”).
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Motion for summary judgment
If the claim cannot be dismissed on the pleadings, the Government can
move for summary judgment.197  In United States v. Harewood,198 the court
granted the motion for summary judgment because the undisputed facts showed
that the defendant’s sister, who had obtained title to the property by virtue of a
quitclaim deed, could not maintain a claim under either § 853(n)(6)(A) or
(n)(6)(B).199
Burden of proof in the ancillary proceeding
In United States v. Nava, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the claimant has
the burden of proof in the ancillary proceeding.200
XV.  Choice of Law
The role of state law
When a claim is filed in the ancillary proceeding, the court must look first to
the law of the jurisdiction that created the property right to determine nature of the
201 See United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2006 WL 211946, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006) (the court properly looks to “the law of the jurisdiction that created
the property right” to determine what interest the claimant has in the property; court looks to
Panamanian law to see what interest claimants have to back wages).
202 See United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (court must look to
state law to see if claimant was the true owner of the property or only a nominee or straw;
there is no federal common law of property in forfeiture cases).
203 United States v. Wendling, 359 F. Supp. 2d 850 (D.N.D. 2005).
204 United States v. Wendling, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 853-54 (following Totaro; court looks
to state law to determine whether defendant’s mother had 50 percent interest in forfeited
property as joint tenant or had made a gift of her interest to her son).
205 United States v. Holden, 2005 WL 1593911 (N.D. Ohio Jul. 7, 2005).
206 Id., at *2-3 (family members did not have a legal interest in defendant’s real property
based on oral agreement and alleged contributions because state law requires transfers of
interest in land be in writing).
207
___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2006 WL 211946, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006).
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claimant’s interest in the property.201  Generally, that means the court looks first to
State law,202 but that is not always the case.
If the property right was created by State law, the federal court will look first
to State law to see what interest the claimant has in the property.  For example, in
United States v. Wendling,203 the court looked to state law to see if the
defendant’s mother owned the property or had gifted it to her son, and concluded
that the mother had only a 50 percent interest in the property.204  If the claimant
has no interest under state law, the inquiry ends and the claim fails.  In United
States v. Holden,205 the Government sought to forfeit a residence used to commit
a drug offense.  The defendant’s family members contended that the defendant
had transferred the property to them, but the court held that the family members
had no legal interest in the property by virtue of a provision of state law that
requires all transfers of an interest in land be in writing.206
If the property interest was created by foreign law, the court must look to
foreign law to see what interest the claimant has in the property.  In United States
v. Speed Joyeros, S.A.,207 the court looked to Panamanian law to see what
interest the claimants had in back wages allegedly owed to them by the
defendant in that country.  
208 See United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. (Petition of Chawla), 46 F.3d
1185, 1190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (constructive trusts are “legal interests,” but they do not exist
until they are imposed by the court, and so cannot support a claim under section 1963(l)(6)(A));
United States v. Strube, 58 F. Supp. 2d 576, 585 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (same) (following BCCI).
209 But see United States v. Wheaton, 2005 WL 2429792, at *4  (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2005)
(court looks to state law to see if claimant is the beneficiary of a constructive trust; claims fails
to satisfy the state law requirement that she lack an adequate remedy at law).
210 See United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2006 WL 211946, *4
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006) (state law determines what interest the claimant has; “the effect of that
interest – i.e. whether it satisfies the requirements of the federal forfeiture statute – is
necessarily a matter of federal law”).
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It follows that if the interest was created by federal law, the court should
look to federal law to determine the nature of the claimant’s interest.  This issue
arises when the federal court is asked to create a legal interest on behalf of the
claimant by imposing a constructive trust.  A constructive trust is a creation of
equity that does not exist until it is imposed by the court.208  Therefore, when the
federal court is asked to designate the forfeited property as the res of the trust,
and to recognize the claimants as the beneficiaries, it must employ principles of
equity generally recognized by the federal courts and not the law of any particular
state.209
The role of federal law
Once the court determines what interest the claimant has in the property
under the law of the jurisdiction that created the property right, it must look to
federal law – i.e., to the provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) – to determine if the
claimant will prevail in the ancillary proceeding.210 Thus, a person who has an
interest in the property under state or foreign law may nevertheless fail to satisfy
211 See United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 2000) (even if claimant
had an interest in the defendant’s drug proceeds as a matter of state law she cannot prevail
unless she qualifies for relief under one of the two prongs of section 853(n)(6)).
212 See United States v. Pierce, 2005 WL 2135142, at *2 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2005) (wife
who had 100 percent interest in jointly held bank account under state law, nevertheless could
not challenge forfeiture of husband’s one-half interest under section 853(n)(6)(A) because, as
a matter of federal law, her interest was not superior to husband’s interest); United States v.
Soreide, No. 03-60235-CR-COHN/SNOW, slip op. at 17-18 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2005) (same
as to fraud proceeds; claimant may have a valid legal interest in the property under state law
but not be able to satisfy the “purchaser for value” element in the federal statute).
213 2005 WL 1126663, at *10-11 (M.D. Fla.  May 6, 2005) (standing in the ancillary
proceeding is limited to persons with a “legal interest” in the property; the defendant, not his
corporation, was the owner of the mortgage on a shopping mall that was subject to forfeiture). 
214 See United States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1999) (defendant lacks
standing to file a claim in the ancillary proceeding because by that time he no longer has any
interest in the property).
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the requirements of the federal statute.211  For example, as discussed below, a
person can have a valid interest under state law and not satisfy the “purchaser”
requirement in § 853(n)(6)(B).212
XVI.  Standing Under Sections 853(n)(2) and 1963(l)(2)
Section 853(n)(2) provides that any person, other than the defendant,
asserting a “legal interest in the property which has been ordered forfeited to the
United States,” may file a claim in the ancillary proceeding.  If the claimant has no
legal interest in the forfeited property, his claim should be dismissed for lack of
standing.  
For example, in United States v. Weiss, the district court held that a
corporation that had no ownership interest in a forfeited mortgage lacked
standing to contest its forfeiture.213
The defendant may not file a claim
Section 853(n)(2) expressly provides that the defendant cannot file a claim
in the ancillary proceeding.214  So, as the Ninth Circuit held in United States v.
215 United States v. Houghton, 132 Fed. Appx. 130 (9th Cir. 2005).
216 United States v. Houghton, 132 Fed. Appx. 130, 131-32 (9th Cir. 2005) (defendant
cannot complain that he did not get notice of the ancillary proceeding; he had no right to
participate in it).
217 See United States v. Watkins, 320 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (unsecured
creditors lack standing to contest the forfeiture in the ancillary proceeding because they have
no interest in the particular assets subject to forfeiture); United States v. Ribadeneira, 105
F.3d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 1997) (person holding check drawn on defendant’s forfeited bank
account is a general unsecured creditor with no interest in specific funds); United States v.
Gordon, 2005 WL 2759845, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005) (following Ribadeneira and
explaining why unsecured creditors lack standing under section 853(n)(2)).
218 United States v. Perkins, 382 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Me. 2005) (following
Ribadeneira; woman to whom defendant owed child support is likely an unsecured creditor
without standing).
219 United States v. Eldick, 2005 WL 2861130 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2005).
220 Id., at *1 (following Watkins; even if claimant did have an oral contract with the
defendant, he was only an unsecured creditor without standing to contest the forfeiture of
47
Houghton,215 the defendant has no right to complain that he did not get notice of
the ancillary proceeding.216
General creditors do not have a legal interest in the forfeited property
Unsecured creditors lack standing because they have no legal interest in
the particular asset that has been forfeited.217  In Perkins, the case involving the
woman claiming that the defendant owed her child support, the court held that
unless the claimant had a recorded lien on the specific assets subject to
forfeiture, she was only an unsecured creditor without standing to contest the
forfeiture of the defendant’s property.218
In United States v. Eldick,219 a defendant was convicted of operating a
medical practice without a license to do so, and was ordered to forfeit the
proceeds of the crime.  In the ancillary proceeding, the defendant’s brother filed a
claim asserting that he and the defendant had entered into an oral contract that
entitled the brother to the proceeds of the medical practice in the event the
defendant operated the practice illegally.  In denying the claim, the district court
held that even if there was such a contract, the claimant was nothing more than
an unsecured creditor with a cause of action against the defendant to enforce its
terms.  He did not have a legal interest in the forfeited property.220
defendant’s assets).
221 United States v. Nnaji, 2005 WL 1049905, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2005).
222 United States v. Wheaton, 2005 WL 2429792, at *7 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2005).
223 See United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. (Final Order of Forfeiture
and Disbursement), 69 F. Supp. 2d 36, 59 (D.D.C. 1999) (a person who voluntarily transfers his
property to the defendant is no longer the owner of that property; his ability to trace his property
to the defendant’s assets is irrelevant; therefore, victims who transferred their property to the
defendant have no greater standing to contest the forfeiture order than other unsecured
creditors); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. (Petitions of Bank Austria), 1997
WL 695668, at *6-7 (D.D.C. Aug. 26,1997) (ability of claimant to trace funds into defendant’s
account is necessary to contest forfeiture but not sufficient if title to funds passed to defendant
and claimant became a general creditor).
224 United States v. Gordon, 2005 WL 2759845 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005).
225 Id., at *2 (seller who did not retain a security interest in the property sold to the
defendant to secure the unpaid balance was an unsecured creditor with no legal interest in the
property under section 853(n)(2)).
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Two other cases involved claimants who had loaned money or materials to
the defendant to make improvements on a residence but had not obtained a lien
on the property.  In both United States v. Nnaji221 and United States v.
Wheaton,222 the district court held that the claimants were unsecured creditors
without standing to contest the forfeiture of the property.
The ability to trace assets to the forfeited property is irrelevant
Third parties often assert that their ability to trace their assets to the
property subject to forfeiture from the defendant somehow gives them a legal
interest in the property sufficient to establish standing to contest the forfeiture; but
one’s ability to prove that he or she was the former owner of property is irrelevant. 
The question isn’t whether the claimant was once the owner of the property but
whether he or she retained any interest in it once it was transferred to the
defendant.223
For example, in United States v. Gordon,224 the claimant sold shares of
stock to the defendant in exchange for cash and a promissory note, but did not
retain a lien or other security interest in the property.  When the Government
obtained an order forfeiting the stock in a criminal case, the court held that the
claimant was merely an unsecured creditor without any legal interest in the
property.  That the claimant was the former owner of the stock was irrelevant.225
226 United States v. Wheaton, 2005 WL 2429792, at *7 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2005)
(claimant could not base standing to contest forfeiture of real property on the fact that it was
her residence).
227 See United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2006 WL 211946, *5
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006) (creditor who obtained a judicial decree affirming his debt and
attached defendant’s property may have acquired an interest in the specific asset, but “it comes
too late in the day” to recover under § 853(n)(6)(A) which protects interests in effect when the
property became subject to forfeiture); United States v. Fuchs, 2005 WL 440429, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 23, 2005) (person who has obtained a civil judgment against the defendant, but who
has not perfected a judgment lien against any specific asset, is an unsecured creditor without
standing to contest the forfeiture of the defendant’s property in the ancillary proceeding).
228 See Pacheco v. Serendensky, 393 F.3d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 2004) (the petitioner must
meet the conditions of either section 853(n)(6)(A) or (n)(6)(B)); United States v. Watkins, 320
F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (section 853(n)(6) protects only two classes of petitioners);
United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000) (the alternative grounds set
forth in sections 853(n)(6)(A) and (B) are the only grounds for recovery in the ancillary
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Person in possession of the property
Nor does it make any difference that the claimant is in physical possession
of the property at the time of the forfeiture.  In Wheaton, the claimant who had
contributed to the cost of the improvements on the defendant’s residence was
also living on the premises, but the district court held that possession of the
property is not the same as a legal interest, and is not sufficient to establish
standing.226
Judgment creditors
A judgment creditor is nothing more than another unsecured creditor,
unless he obtains a judgment lien on a specific asset.  In a case involving highly
sympathetic claimants, a district court in Texas held that the parents of a person
who had died from a drug overdose caused by the defendant had no standing to
contest the forfeiture of the defendant’s assets, even though they had obtained a
$2 million judgment against the defendant in state court.227
XVII.  Superior Legal Interest Under Section 853(n)(6)(A)
There are two grounds for recovery in the ancillary proceeding; the
claimant must either demonstrate priority-of-ownership at the time of the offense
under § 853(n)(6)(A), or that he subsequently acquired the property as a bona
fide purchaser for value under § 853(n)(6)(B).228
proceeding).
229 See United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (because the
Government’s interest in the property vested at the time of the offense giving rise to the
forfeiture under the relation back doctrine, claimant can recover under section 853(n)(6)(A)
only if her interest vested before that time); United States v. Perkins, 382 F. Supp. 2d 146,
148-49 (D. Me. 2005) (lienholder interest that claimant did not acquire until after real property
was used to commit drug offense cannot support claim under section 853(n)(6)(A)).
230 See United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2000) (to prevail under
section 853(n)(6)(A), the claimant must have a preexisting interest in the forfeited property;
because proceeds do not exist before the commission of the underlying offense,
section 853(n)(6)(A) can never be used to challenge the forfeiture of proceeds),
231 United States v. Soreide, No. 03-60235-CR-COHN/SNOW (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2005).
232 United States v. Soreide, No. 03-60235-CR-COHN/SNOW, slip op. at 11-12 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 22, 2005) (following Hooper and applying it not only to claimant’s attempt to assert an
interest in the proceeds themselves, but also to her attempt to assert an interest in property
traceable to the proceeds).
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Paragraph (6)(A) embodies the relation back doctrine; it provides that a
third party who had a legal interest in the forfeited property before the underlying
crime was committed can prevail in the ancillary proceeding on the ground that
he had an interest in the property before the Government’s interest vested, but
one who acquired his interest at a later date cannot.229 Several years ago, the
Ninth Circuit held that a third party can never have a successful claim under
Section 853(n)(6)(A) if the property was the proceeds of the offense.  As the
panel explained, the proceeds of an offense do not exist before the offense is
committed, and when they come into existence, the Government’s interest under
the relation back doctrine immediately vests.  Thus, a third party contesting the
forfeiture of proceeds could possibly prevail under the bona fide purchaser
provision in § 853(n)(6)(B), but never under the priority-of-ownership provision in
§ 853(n)(6)(A).230
In United States v. Soreide,231 a district court in Florida extended this rule,
holding that if a third party could not make a successful claim under
§ 853(n)(6)(A) to the proceeds of the offense, neither could she make a claim to
real property that the defendant purchased with the proceeds of the offense.232
XVIII.  Bona Fide Purchasers Under Section 853(n)(6)(B)
The defense under section 853(n)(6)(B) has three elements
233 United States v. Soreide, No. 03-60235-CR-COHN/SNOW, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 22, 2005) (the three elements of the defense are separate and conjunctive).
234 Id., slip op. at 16-17 (wife gave no value for the property; therefore, it was
unnecessary to decide if she had reason to know it was forfeitable).
235 Id., slip op. at 14 (notwithstanding all of the interests she might have acquired in
marital property under state law, a wife cannot successfully contest the forfeiture of the property
as a bona fide purchaser unless she acquired her interest for value in an arms-length
transaction), following United States v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 279 (4th Cir. 2003) (wife who
acquired property from husband-defendant in less than arm’s-length transaction was not a bona
fide purchaser).
236 In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 291 (4th Cir. 2005) (family member who received
promissory note as a gift was not a bona fide purchaser for value of the land that he acquired
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Section 853(n)(6)(B) is an exception to the relation back doctrine; it
provides that a person who acquired an interest in the forfeited property after the
Government’s interest vested may nevertheless prevail in the ancillary
proceeding if he was a bona fide purchaser for value.  This defense has three
elements: the claimant must show (1) that he has a legal interest in the forfeited
property; (2) that the interest was acquired as a bona fide purchaser for value;
and (3) that the interest was acquired at a time when the claimant was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.
In Soreide, the court pointed out that these are separate and conjunctive
requirements.233  Thus, the court does not reach the “cause to believe” element if
the claimant does not establish that he or she was a purchaser for value.234
Donees and family members are not bona fide purchasers
A person who receives the property as a gift, by inheritance, or by virtue of
marital property law, is not a “purchaser.”  Thus, in Soreide, the court held that
the defendant’s wife could not prevail as a bona fide purchaser for value under
§ 853(n)(6)(B) unless she acquired the property from her husband in an arms-
length transaction.235
Similarly, in Bryson the Fourth Circuit held that a claimant who received the
forfeited property as a gift from his father was not a bona fide purchaser for value
even though he invested money, time and effort in improving the property and
perfecting his title to it.  In short, property originally conveyed as a gift remains a
gift regardless of what happens later.236
by enforcing the note even though he invested time and effort in doing so).
237 United States v. Harewood, 2005 WL 2076543, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2005)
(defendant’s sister, to whom he quitclaimed his real property for $0, was not a bona fide
purchaser for value).
238 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 633 n.10 (1989).
239 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Assail, Inc., 410 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2005).
240 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Assail, Inc., 410 F.3d at 265-66 (under
section 853(n)(6)(B) an attorney who is “objectively on notice” that his fees may derive from a
tainted source has an affirmative duty to conduct an inquiry into the source of the fee and may
not rely on his client’s representations that the fee was derived from a legitimate source; “The
mere fact that an attorney has read the indictment against his client is enough to put him on
notice that his fees are potentially tainted and to destroy his status as a bona fide purchaser
52
Finally, the district court in Harewood held that a person who did not pay
fair market value for the property cannot be considered a “purchaser” within the
meaning of the forfeiture statute.  Accordingly, the court rejected the claim of the
defendant’s sister who had acquired the property by quitclaim deed for zero
consideration.237
Claimant must be reasonably without cause to believe the property was subject to
forfeiture
Even if the claimant shows that he gave something of value for the
property, he will not prevail unless he satisfies the “reasonably without cause to
believe” element of the statute.  This is a problem for defense attorneys who give
services in return for criminal proceeds.  As the Supreme Court said in Caplin &
Drysdale, “given the requirement that any assets which the Government wishes
to have forfeited must be specified in the indictment, the only way a lawyer could
be a beneficiary of section 853(n)(6)(B) would be to fail to read the indictment of
his client.”238
The Fifth Circuit discussed this point at length in a non-forfeiture case in
which the panel drew parallels to forfeiture law.  In FTC v. Assail,239 the court said
that under forfeiture law, an attorney who is “objectively on notice” that his fees
may derive from a tainted source has an affirmative duty to conduct an inquiry
into the source of the fee and may not rely on his client’s representations that the
fee was derived from a legitimate source.  An attorney who fails to take these
steps would not, in the panel’s view, satisfy the requirements of § 853(n)(6)(B).240
for value.”).
241 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(7).
242 United States v. Puig, 419 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir. 2005) (if no third party files a
timely claim, the United States has clear title to the property pursuant to section 853(n)(7)).
243 Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents, 401 F.3d 419, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2005) (third
party who lost in the ancillary proceeding cannot make a collateral attack on the forfeiture,
such as by filing a Bivens action).
244 United States v. Elliott, 149 Fed. Appx. 489, 492-93 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendant has a
right to appeal amendment to order of forfeiture to include substitute asset, but appeal is
governed by Rule 4(b) and thus must be filed within 10 days unless the time is extended by
the court).
245 United States v. Betancourt, 2005 WL 3348908, *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2005).
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XIX.  Clear Title to Forfeited Property
The ancillary proceeding gives the Government clear title to the forfeited
property.241 In Puig, the Eighth Circuit held that if no one files a claim in the
ancillary proceeding, the Government gets clear title to the property
automatically.242  And in Baranski, the Sixth Circuit said that a third party whose
claim was rejected in the ancillary proceeding cannot make a collateral attack on
the judgment in another forum, such as by filing a Bivens action.243
XX.  Appeals
The time to appeal from an order of forfeiture is governed by Appellate
Rule 4(b)(1)(B).  In Elliott, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant can appeal
the amendment to the order of forfeiture to include substitute assets, but must do
so within 10 days of the order.244
Under Rule 32.2(d), the court may not transfer any portion of the forfeited
property to a third party while the defendant’s appeal is pending, unless the
defendant consents.  In United States v. Betancourt, the district court noted that
the parties followed this procedure when the defendant agreed to a division of the
property and distribution of 50 percent of it to an innocent third party while his
appeal was pending.245  But things did not work out exactly as planned for the
defendant in that case.  His understanding was that the third party would
immediately kick back a portion of her share to the defendant so that he could
246 Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents, 401 F.3d 419, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (third party’s
right to appeal adverse decision in the ancillary proceeding is independent of defendant’s
appeal from his conviction).
247 See United States v. Hodges, 404 F.3d 354, 354 (5th Cir. 2005) (if there are
multiple claims in the ancillary proceeding, one third party cannot appeal until all claims are
resolved, unless the court determines per Rule 32.2(c)(3) that “there is no just reason for
delay”).
248 In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2005) (under Rule 32.2(c)(3), a third party
cannot appeal from the dismissal of his claim until all other claims are resolved by the district
court; however, the court of appeals will have jurisdiction to consider the premature claim if
the remaining claims are resolved before the appeal is heard on the merits).
249 See United States v. Houghton, 132 Fed. Appx. 130, 132 (9th Cir. 2005) (notice of
appeal does not stop the ancillary proceeding).
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pay his attorney’s fee, but the tax collector was standing by to seize the money to
satisfy a tax deficiency instead.
Appeal by the third party from the ancillary proceeding
A third party claimant can appeal an adverse decision in the ancillary
proceeding; as the Sixth Circuit held in Baranski, the third party’s right to file such
an appeal is independent of the defendant’s appeal from his conviction.246  If
there are multiple claims, however, one third party cannot appeal until all of the
other third party claims are resolved, unless the court determines pursuant to
Rule 32.2(c)(3) that there is no reason to delay the appeal.247
In Bryson, the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court had not made the
necessary finding under the Rule; thus, the court was inclined to hold that the
appeal before it was premature.  But the panel held that because all of the
competing claims were in fact resolved before the appeal was heard on the
merits, there was no violation of the Rule after all.248
Jurisdiction Pending Appeal
The defendant’s appeal does not affect the district court’s jurisdiction to
conduct the ancillary proceeding.249
XXI.  Forfeiture and Restitution
250 In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC, 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005).
251 Id. at 564 (section 853(i)(2) gives the Government the authority to compromise a
criminal forfeiture with the defendant and third parties; victims have no right under the Crime
Victims Rights Act to object to the forfeiture agreement on the ground that it leaves the
defendant with no funds to pay as restitution).
252 United States v. Bisig, 2005 WL 3532554 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2005).
253 Id., at *4, *6 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (“the United States cannot sidestep the requirement to
share recovery with the relator . . . by merely electing to recover through criminal forfeiture
proceedings;” thus, the relator must receive his share before the Attorney General can use the
forfeited funds for victim restitution under § 853(i)).
254 United States v. Dawson, 425 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2005).
255 United States v. Dawson, 425 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that
a witness who would be paid a percentage of the amount forfeited if the defendant is
convicted should not be permitted to testify against the defendant).
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In In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC,250 the Second Circuit held
that crime victims have no right to object to the forfeiture of the defendant’s
property on the ground that it impairs their ability to get restitution.251
In United States v. Bisig,252 however, a district court held that the
Government cannot use forfeiture as a way around the Government’s obligation
to the relator in a qui tam action.253
XXII.  Award to Informants
In United States v. Dawson,254 the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument
that paying a percentage of the amount forfeited to an informant automatically
disqualified the informant as a witness.  The proper safeguard against unreliable
testimony, the court said, is requiring that the promise of payment be disclosed to
the jury.255
XXIII.  The Application of Section 2461(c) to Fraud Cases
Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) provides that the Government may bring a
criminal forfeiture action whenever a defendant is convicted of an offense for
256 See United States v. Razmilovic, 419 F.3d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 2005) (section 2461(c)
“authorizes criminal forfeiture as a punishment for any act for which civil forfeiture is authorized,
and allows the Government to combine criminal conviction and criminal forfeiture in a
consolidated proceeding”); United States v. Wittig,2004 WL 1490046, at *2 (D. Kan. Jun 30,
2004) (section 2461(c) “allows criminal forfeiture to be sought anytime there is a civil forfeiture
provision but no corresponding criminal forfeiture statute”); Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown
Agents, 401 F.3d 419, 434 (6th Cir. 2005) (section 2461(c) authorizes criminal forfeiture for
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(1) because civil forfeiture is authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 5872);
United States v. Baranski, 75 Fed. Appx. 566, 568-69 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v.
Reiner, 397 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D. Me. 2005) (“If [property] is subject to civil forfeiture, it is
also subject to criminal forfeiture, 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)”).
257 See United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267, 275-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(rejecting Croce and Thompson and holding that criminal forfeiture of mail and wire fraud
proceeds under sections 2461(c) and 981(a)(1)(C) is coextensive with civil forfeiture; citing
legislative history); United States v. Lebed, 2005 WL 2495843, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2005)
(disagreeing with Croce II; plain language of section 2461(c) and legislative history of CAFRA
indicate that Congress meant to authorize criminal forfeiture for all mail and wire fraud
offenses).  But see United States v. Croce, 345 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(Croce II) (the Government may not forfeit mail fraud proceeds under sections 981(a)(1)(C)
and 2461(c) because the more specific provision in section 982(a)(2) limiting such forfeitures
to cases affecting a financial institution preempts the field).
258 United States v. Rutledge, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 328271 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2006).
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which any form of forfeiture — civil or criminal — is authorized.256  As originally
enacted, however, the statute provided that it would apply only where “no specific
statutory provision is made for criminal forfeiture upon conviction.”  In cases
involving mail and wire fraud, the Government typically relies on § 2461(c) and
the civil forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), to forfeit the proceeds of the
crime.  A number of defendants argued, however, that because there were
specific provisions for criminal forfeiture for mail and wire fraud in 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(2) and (8), the Government could not rely on § 2461(c) to seek criminal
forfeiture in such cases.  
In 2004 and 2005, two district courts rejected this argument and one
accepted it.257  Then in early 2006 the Ninth Circuit held in United States v.
Rutledge258 that the defendants’ limited view of § 2461(c) had no merit.  
Sections 982(a)(2) and (8), the panel observed, authorize criminal forfeiture
of fraud proceeds only in cases involving fraud affecting a financial institution and
telemarketing.  If, as the defendants contended, the existence of those provisions
meant that § 2461(c) could never apply in a mail or wire fraud case, there would
be no criminal forfeiture authority in a case where the defendant was charged
259 Id., at *2.
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with a species of fraud other than those set forth in those statutes.  In the court’s
view, that could not be what Congress intended.
“The most natural meaning of this language,” the court said, “is that
criminal forfeiture is authorized under section 2461(c) when no criminal forfeiture
provision applies to the charges made against the particular charged individual. 
There is no reason why Congress would choose to make criminal forfeiture
almost universally available for property subject to civil forfeiture but would
exempt proceeds from particular kinds of mail and wire fraud.”  Accordingly, the
court held that Defendant’s case represented exactly the situation in which
§ 2461(c) was meant to apply.259
In the Act reauthorizing the USA Patriot Act, Congress resolved this issue
once and for all by redrafting § 2461(c) to eliminate the limitation to cases where
there was no other criminal forfeiture authority.  Thus, under the new version of
the statute, it is clear that criminal forfeiture is authorized in all cases where there
is civil forfeiture authority, and that the procedures in § 853 apply to all stages of
such cases.
Conclusion
The case law on criminal forfeiture procedure is extremely volatile.  Tens of
cases are decided every month, reflecting the increasing use of this important law
enforcement tool by federal prosecutors.  Indeed, it is clear that criminal forfeiture
has become a standard part of the criminal process.  Thus, the deluge of new
case law is certain to continue for the foreseeable future.
